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CRASHWORTHINESS: THE COLLISION OF SELLERS' RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PRODUCT SAFETY WITH COMPARATIVE FAULT

F. Patrick Hubbard* & Evan Sobocinski"
ABSTRACT

Crashworthinesscases often involve the following issue: should
any wrongdoing by the plaintiffin causing the initialcollision reduce
or bar the plaintiff's recovery for defective crashworthiness?
Jurisdictionsdisagree on the answer to this issue. This disagreement
results in large partfrom diferingpositions on two questions. First,
should products liability law use duty rules to impose liability in a
way that ensures efficient accident cost reduction or should it seek
fairness through relatively unstructuredjury allocations of liability
based onfault? Second, in addressingthefirst issue, shouldfor-profit
corporationsbe viewed as: (1) "tools" to achieve human goals like
efficient reduction of accident costs or (2) "persons"entitled to fair
treatment in the same way as humans.
Relying on an analysis of doctrine, history, and policy, this
Article argues (1) thatfor-profit corporations are tools, not persons
with moral rights, and (2) because these corporationsare not "moral
persons, " the concern for efficient reduction of accident costs by
internalizingthe cost of injuriesfrom product defects to corporations
shouldprevailover a concernfor 'fairness" to these corporationsin
allocating accident costs.
Therefore,
because reducing
manufacturers' liability for crashworthiness also reduces the
efficient internalization to manufacturers of the cost of theirfailure
to provide cost-effective safety, the plaintiffs role in causing the
initial accident should be irrelevantto plaintiffs claimfor defective
crashworthiness. This concernfor internalizationalso supports the
expansion ofplaintiff's rights in other areas of liabilityfor defective
vehicle design.
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INTRODUCTION

The crashworthiness doctrine requires automobile manufacturers to use
reasonable care in designing a vehicle in a manner that will address not only
the initial collision of a vehicle with another object but also the enhanced
injury from the second collision that results when occupants collide with the
interior of the vehicle or are ejected from the vehicle.' It might seem that
Donze v. General Motors, LLC, 2 a recent South Carolina Supreme Court
decision, simply addressed a narrow issue concerning this doctrine: does
comparative fault apply to the enhanced injury resulting from a failure to make
an automobile reasonably crashworthy? Comparative fault generally applies
to injuries from the initial collision, but the states are split concerning the
3
approach for the second collision.
Donze adopted the minority position on this issue and held that
comparative fault did not apply. As a result, fault of the victim or third parties
in causing the initial collision is irrelevant. Therefore, manufacturers are liable
for the full amount of any enhanced injuries caused by the defective

1.
See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or
DistributorofMotor Vehicle for Defect Which Merely EnhancesInjury from Accident Otherwise
Caused, 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
2.
420 S.C. 8, 800 S.E.2d 479 (2017).
3.
See id. at 14-19, 800 S.E.2d at 482-84. For further discussion of this split, see infra
notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
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crashworthiness of a vehicle. This decision was based largely on the court's
answer to the basic legal issue underlying any plaintiffs claim: What is the
duty that the defendant owes to the plaintiff? The answer of Donze to this
question is clear: manufacturers have a duty to address foreseeable collisions
by designing reasonably crashworthy vehicles regardless of how a specific
foreseeable accident occurs.4
The seemingly narrow focus of Donze is deceptive because, from a
broader perspective, the issue involved reflects deep conceptual conflicts
between two of the most important developments in tort law in the second half
of the twentieth century: (1) the imposition of increased safety obligations on
product manufacturers, and (2) the widespread adoption of "comparative
responsibility." The importance of these two areas is reflected in the decisions
of the American Law Institute (ALI) to publish two separate volumes of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts before publishing the first two volumes of the
general Restatement (Third) of Torts.' One of these separate volumes
addressed products liability; 6 the other addressed the allocation of liability. 7
Moreover, enhanced injury issues arise in other areas as well. For
example, if medical malpractice arises in the context of treating a person
whose negligence in driving resulted in injuries, will that negligence be
compared to the medical negligence? What if the situation arises in the case
of a doctor treating a smoker with lung cancer?'
In effect, the disagreement among the states concerning enhanced injury
from vehicle collisions results from a disagreement about which of these
developments should prevail-i.e., whether: (1) because of the concern for
efficient accident reduction, the duty imposed on products manufacturers to
address foreseeable enhanced injuries from second collisions will apply so
long as the plaintiff's role, no matter how "wrongful," in the causal chain of
the initial collision is foreseeable, or (2) because of a concern for fairness,
comparative fault has the dominant role in addressing the responsibility of all
the parties, including plaintiffs and third parties whose wrongs were a causein-fact of the injuries from the second collision.

4.
5.

See id. at 19-23, 800 S.E.2d at 485-87; see infra notes 16-48 and accompanying text.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (AM.
LAW INST. 2010 & 2012).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
7.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
8.
See infra notes 481-486 and accompanying text for further discussion of enhanced
injuries in the context of medical malpractice.
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This perspective is important for two reasons. First, because of the
partially contemporaneous evolution of products liability and comparative
fault, the perspective helps place specific cases within the time frame of both
developments. 9 Second, it highlights two fundamental differences between
the two approaches.
The first difference in the approaches involves the techniques used to
allocate liability. Products liability utilizes the relatively fixed and precise
structure of traditional tort: duty, breach, causation, damages, and defenses.
The rules concerning this structure are usually based on explicit policies.
Disagreement about the rules can often be understood (and perhaps addressed)
in terms of these policies.
In contrast, comparative fault uses a virtually unstructured, ad hoc
approach. Where a claim against a vehicle seller satisfies the rules of products
liability and at least one party other than the product seller is at fault, the
allocation of "fault" in terms of percentages is given to the jury. These
percentages are then applied to determine whether the plaintiff can recover
and, where some recovery is allowed, how much plaintiff can recover.' 0
Often, comparative fault statutes provide no guidance for this
apportionment." Where guidance is given, it is typically phrased in terms like
the following: "In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault, and the extent
of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed."' 2

9.
See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text for discussion of an important example
of the need to consider the context of doctrinal development.
10. See infra notes 248-249 and accompanying text (discussing types of comparative
fault schemes), 309-314 (discussing example of impact of one specific approach to comparative
fault).
11. For example, the statutes in Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, and Texas
provide no guidance. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (2017); IND. CODE § 34-20-8-1(b) (2016);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(2) (West 2016); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2016); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (2016).
12. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(b) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(2)
(West 2016). This language is based on UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 43
(1977). The Apportionment of Liability Restatement adopts a similar approach. See infra note
255 and accompanying text. Comment d to Section 17 of the Products Liability Restatement
states as follows: "When evidence of plaintiff fault is established, how much responsibility to
attribute to a plaintiff will vary with the circumstances. The seriousness of the plaintiffs fault
and the nature of the product defect are relevant in apportioning the appropriate percentages of
responsibility between the plaintiff and the product seller."
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Because of the variety of schemes of allocating recovery, some
jurisdictions simply use the term "comparative causation."' 3 Depending upon
the jurisdiction and, perhaps, the trial judge's discretion, the jury may not
know what the effect of these percentages will be even though the effect in
some jurisdictions will be that plaintiff receives no recovery.1 4 This vague,
open-ended approach is particularly problematic where for-profit corporations
are defendants because these corporations focus on liability costs, as opposed
to collision costs, in making decisions about the amount of money to spend
on crashworthiness.' 5
The second fundamental difference in the two approaches results from a
disagreement concerning the answer to the following question: what is the
nature of for-profit product manufacturers? Decisions like Donze view these
corporations as nonhuman institutions with special social responsibilities, like
efficient safety in design, that are defined in terms of tort duties. In contrast,
comparative fault treats these corporations as the equivalent of human
persons, which means these corporations are entitled to be treated as fairly as
humans treat one another and are thus entitled to a fair, though unstructured,
allocation of comparative fault.
This Article will use this broad perspective to address the treatment of
enhanced injuries. Part II discusses Donze and summarizes the majority and
minority approaches to enhanced injuries in the context of products liability.
Part III sketches the development of the areas of products liability and
comparative fault in terms of both the doctrine and the policies underlying
each area. Part IV uses policy to compare the majority view concerning the
role of a plaintiff s fault with the minority view adopted by Donze and to argue
that Donze is correct.
More specifically, this Article argues that for-profit corporations should
be treated as entities to be utilized in achieving efficient reduction in accident
costs. Based on this view, Donze uses the traditional tort structure to impose
duties based upon specific policy goals. Because corporations lack the moral
right to fairness that humans have, they are not entitled to the application of
the unstructured, ad hoc scheme of comparative fault to all aspects of
wrongful causation-in-fact. This results in giving products liability and
efficient accident cost reduction dominance by explicitly defining duty in

13. E.g., Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (Kan. 1980); Arbegast v. Bd. of
Educ. of S. New Berlin Cent. Sch., 480 N.E.2d 365, 366 (N.Y. 1985); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984).
14. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 17.05 (5th ed. 2010). See
infra note 249 and accompanying text for discussion of possibility of loss of any right of
recovery under modified comparative negligence schemes.
15. See infra notes 307-309, 343-346, 354-427 and accompanying text.
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terms that treat any fault by the plaintiff or third parties in causing the initial
collision as irrelevant to the allocation of the costs of the injuries caused by
the second collision. As a result of this approach, for-profit corporations must
focus on accident costs rather than on liability costs that have been reduced as
a result of comparative fault.
Part V addresses important issues not addressed in Donze. Part VI
summarizes the arguments and conclusions in this Article.
II.

DONZE V. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

A.

Majority Opinion

The facts of Donze v. General Motors, LLC were stated by the court as
follows:
... Donze and his friend, Allen Brazell, were driving ... in
Donze's ... pickup truck.... [There was] evidence ... indicating
Brazell and Donze had been smoking synthetic marijuana earlier that
morning.... [T]hey came to an intersection controlled by a stop sign.
Brazell failed to stop and pulled directly in front of a ... truck towing
a horse trailer. Unable to stop, the Ford struck Donze's truck on the
driver's side, and the truck burst into flames. Brazell died as a result
of the fire, and Donze suffered severe bums to eighty percent of his

body. 16
Donze filed suit in federal district court alleging that the truck's
placement of the gas tank outside of the frame of the truck was not a
reasonably crashworthy design.' 7 General Motors (GM) filed a motion for
summary judgment on the ground that, given the nature of the impairment of
Donze and Brazell, public policy barred recovery. In the alternative, GM
argued that comparative negligence should apply to limit Donze's damages.' 8
The motion was denied, and the district court certified the following
questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court:
I. Does comparative negligence in causing an accident apply in a
crashworthiness case when the plaintiff alleges claims of strict

16.
17.
18.

Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 10, 800 S.E.2d 479, 480 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 11, 800 S.E.2d at 480.
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liability and breach of warranty and is seeking damages related only
to the plaintiffs enhanced injuries?
II. Does South Carolina's public policy bar impaired drivers from
recovering damages in a crashworthiness case when the plaintiff
alleges claims of strict liability and breach of warranty?' 9
The South Carolina Supreme Court answered both questions with a "no." 2 0
As indicated above, Donze v. General Motors adopted the minority
position and held that neither comparative negligence nor public policy would
bar or limit Donze's recovery for injuries caused by any crashworthiness
defect. In terms of doctrinal categories, both positions agree that
manufacturers have a duty to utilize a reasonably crashworthy design to
address all foreseeable crash scenarios. However, the opposing positions
disagree on which of the following approaches is dominant: (1) the products
liability approach focusing on reducing the number and severity of injuries
from crashes, or (2) the comparative fault approach focusing on broad notions
of "fault" and fairness. Injury cost reduction and spreading prevail under the
minority view; comparative responsibility and "fairness" prevail under the
majority view.
The preference of Donze v. GeneralMotors for cost reduction is reflected
throughout the opinion. South Carolina recognized the reasonable
crashworthiness doctrine in Mickle v. Blackmon,2 1 which was one of the first
cases to adopt the doctrine. 22 The Donze opinion begins its analysis with the
following discussion of Mickle:
In Mickle we recognized the high frequency of roadway accidents is
common knowledge such that "an automobile manufacturer knows
with certainty that many users of his product will be involved in
collisions, and that the incidence and extent of injury to them will
frequently be determined by the placement, design and construction
of [the vehicle's] components ...

."

Therefore, we held vehicle

manufacturers have a duty "to take reasonable precautions in the light
of the known risks, balancing the likelihood of harm, and the gravity

19. Id.
20. Id. at 23, 800 S.E.2d at 487.
21. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Ghent, supra note 1 (updated listing of states adopting doctrine with year of
decision). The early adoption by South Carolina is also reflected in the discussion in Mickle of
the lack of cases addressing the issue. See Mickle, 252 S.C. at 230-31, 166 S.E.2d at 185-86.
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of harm if it should happen against the burden of feasible precautions
which would tend to avoid or minimize the harm." 2 3
This concern for safety underlies the court's concern in Donze to ensure
that the incentive to adopt "reasonable precautions" would not be reduced by
using comparative negligence to "reduce the manufacturer's liability or shift
that responsibility to another party." 2 4 Incentivizing safety also plays a role in
analyzing the nature of the duty in a crashworthiness claim. "[B]ecause an
underlying accident is presumed in crashworthiness cases, a manufacturer's
liability is predicated on whether the injuries were enhanced by a defect in the
automobile, not on the precipitating cause of the collision."2 5 Where "a duty
[to prevent a known risk] exists ... clearly the very act which the defendant
has a duty to prevent cannot constitute contributory negligence or assumption
of the risk as a matter of law."

26

The court gave two reasons for rejecting arguments that statutes required
the application of comparative fault. First, South Carolina judicially replaced
contributory negligence with comparative fault in 1991 in Nelson v. Concrete
Supply Co.,27 and there is no statute establishing a scheme for addressing
plaintiffs' fault.28 In contrast, strict liability and warranty claims are based on
statutes. 29 Donze notes that "[if] the General Assembly intends for
comparative negligence to constitute a defense [to a crashworthiness claim]

23. Donze, 420 S.C. at 13, 800 S.E.2d at 481 (citations omitted) (quoting Mickle, 252
S.C. at 230, 243, 166 S.E.2d at 185, 192).
24. Id at 19, 800 S.E.2d at 485.
25. Id at 17-18, 800 S.E.2d at 484 (citing Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 548,
565 (D.S.C. 1999)).
26. Id at 18, 800 S.E.2d at 484 (quoting Bramlette v. Charter-Med.-Columbia, 302 S.C.
68, 74,393 S.E.2d 914,917 (1990)). Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281,286 (N.J. 1972),
adopts a similar position concerning the "fault" of a victim: "The asserted negligence of
plaintiff placing his hand under the ram while at the same time depressing the foot pedalwas the very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against. It would be
anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that duty
results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against."
27. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991). This case is discussed further at notes 264-272
and accompanying text.
28. There is a South Carolina statute establishing a comparative fault system for
allocating liability among defendants. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (Supp. 2017). In addressing
the comparison of plaintiffs fault with defendant's fault, this scheme simply states that a trial
court should "determine the percentage of fault, if any, of plaintiff and the amount of recoverable
damages under applicable rules concerning 'comparative negligence'. . . ."Id § 15-38-15(c)(2).
This statute is discussed further infra notes 264-272 and accompanying text.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10, -20 (2005) (strict liability); id. § 36-2-314, -317 (2003)
(warranty).
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under either of these [statutory] theories, it is unquestionably capable of
amending these statutory schemes accordingly." 3 0 Second, even though strict
liability for products was established by statute in South Carolina, 3' it did not
matter whether the claim was based on negligence or strict liability because
"the heart of the crashworthiness doctrine remains the same manufacturer
liability for enhanced injuries following a foreseeable collision."32
B.

ConcurringOpinion

The concurring opinion of Justice Kittredge indicates his agreement with
the majority opinion.33 However, he is concerned that the focused nature of
the certified questions presents the risk "that even a slight tilting of the facts
can impact the analysis and alter the conclusion." 3 4 As an example, he asks
whether, if a defendant "presents evidence that the plaintiffs comparative
fault in the initial collision was a proximate cause of the so-called 'enhanced
injuries,' is the manufacturer entitled to present evidence of the plaintiffs
comparative fault?" 3 5 Justice Kittredge indicates that he "would say yes" to
this question. 36 This "yes" answer is problematic for several reasons.
First, because Justice Kittredge gives no reasons for this answer, it is not
possible to know, for example, precisely how the evidence might be relevant
to proximate cause.
Second, comparative fault and proximate cause operate very differently.
If a plaintiff cannot show proximate cause, there is no recovery. In contrast,
adopting the majority position concerning the second collision would allow a
South Carolina plaintiff to receive at least partial recovery if his fault does not
exceed fifty percent of the total fault.3 7
Third, proximate cause in South Carolina is often used to refer to both
cause-in-fact and "legal cause," which is synonymous with the narrower use
of the term "proximate cause" in most states.38 Consequently, given the lack

30. Donze, 420 S.C. at 19, 800 S.E.2d at 485.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 to -30 (1976).
32. Donze, 420 S.C. at 20, 800 S.E.2d at 485 (citing Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., 74 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 565 (D.S.C. 1999)).
33. Id. at 24, 800 S.E.2d at 487.
34. Id.
35. Id., 800 S.E.2d at 487-88.
36. Id., 800 S.E.2d at 488.
37. See infra notes 264-279 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
38. See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS 152-53 (4th ed. 2011).
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of reasons for his answer of "yes," it is not clear whether Justice Kittredge is
referring to cause-in-fact or "legal cause."
Clarity on this point is important. Cause-in-fact is certainly relevant in a
case like Donze because, if lack of crashworthiness was not the cause-in-fact
of plaintiff's injuries, plaintiff has no claim. On the other hand, if "legal cause"
is at issue, then other problems result because terms like "legal cause" and
"proximate cause" are infamous for their lack of a clear test or definition and
thus for their potential to hinder clear analysis.39
The closest thing to a test in South Carolina is the concept of
foreseeability. 40 For example, an often-cited South Carolina case states:
A reading of any of the host of decisions in this State clearly discloses
that the touchstone of proximate cause in South Carolina is
foreseeability. "Foreseeability of some injury from an act or omission
is a prerequisite to its being a proximate cause of injury for which
recovery is sought.". . . The standard by which foreseeability is
determined is that of looking to the "natural and probable
consequences" of the complained of act.

. .

. While it is not necessary

that the actor must have contemplated or could have anticipated the
particular event which occurred,... liability cannot rest on mere
possibilities. 4 1
Though using foreseeability to address both duty and proximate cause (as well
as negligence in some instances) has been widely questioned, 42 Courts

continue to use it in various contexts. 43
However, there is no problem with potential confusion in the
crashworthiness context. The decision in 1969, in Mickle v. Blackmon,44 to

39. See, e.g., Accordini v. Sec. Cent., Inc., 283 S.C. 16, 18, 320 S.E.2d 713,714 (Ct. App.
1984) (referring to proximate cause as an "elusive butterfly"); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note
38, at 163-66; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984).
For a classic critique of proximate cause, see LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
(1927).
40. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 165-71.
41. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 462-63, 242 S.E.2d 671, 675-76 (1978)
(citations omitted).
42.

§ 7, cmt.

E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

i, j (AM. LAW INST. 2010 & 2012); W. Jonathan Cardi, PurgingForeseeability:The
New Vision ofDuty andJudicialPower in the ProposedRestatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND.
L. REv. 739 (2005); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247 (2009).
43. Zipursky, supra note 42, at 1255-71 (discussing cases and doctrines).
44. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
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impose a duty to provide a reasonably crashworthy vehicle was based on the
following:
[A] frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use
will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts. No rational
basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in
design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident, as the
accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called
"second collision" of the passenger with the interior part of the
automobile, all are foreseeable. 45
Given the role of foreseeability in Mickle, using proximate cause in the
sense of legal cause to deny recovery in a crashworthiness case would be
somewhat like arguing that the intervention of a thief was so outrageous that
a defective burglar alarm could not be the proximate cause of a successful
theft. 46 Similarly, it would be illogical to view drunk driving by a plaintiff,
which is clearly foreseeable conduct, to cancel out the imposition of the duty
of due care in addressing crashworthiness. 47 As noted by the majority opinion
in Donze, evidence of a plaintiffs negligent driving was irrelevant to the
crashworthiness issue because, "once the defendant has 'a duty to protect
persons from consequences of their own foreseeable faulty conduct, it makes
no sense to deny recovery because of the nature of the plaintiff s conduct."' 48
C. Analysis ofAuthorities on Issue of ComparativeFault
Though a majority/minority split has developed on the issue of
comparative negligence in crashworthiness claims, simply counting up cases
on each side can be deceiving for several reasons. First, it is frequently hard
to: (1) find the law for all states, and (2) interpret the law of a state. As a result,

45. Id. at 232, 166 S.E.2d at 186 (quoting Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,
502 (8th Cir. 1968)).
46. See, e.g., Accordini v. Sec. Cent., Inc., 283 S.C. 16, 19-20, 320 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Ct.
App. 1984) (posing the question, "[W]hy would anyone buy a burglar alarm if a theft of his
property was unforeseeable?").
47. Drunk driving is not "highly extraordinary" like the conduct involved in Young v.
Tide Craft, Inc. See 270 S.C. 453, 465, 242 S.E.2d 671, 677 (1978) (noting that the court was
"appalled at the highly extraordinary" character of the deliberate wrongfulness of the actions of
an intervening wrongdoer).
48. Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 17, 800 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2017) (quoting
Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205,212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (quoting Green
v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 471 A.2d 15, 20 (N.J. 1984))).
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judgment calls and errors are inevitable, and reasonable persons could
disagree as to how to categorize some states.49
The second problem is that only twenty states have sufficiently reliable
authority to determine whether comparative fault would be included in a case
like Donze. Of these states, thirteen have included comparative fault50 and
seven have not included comparative fault.5
Third, within the states that include comparative fault, there are often
significant differences in terms of details concerning defenses and treatment
of defenses. 52 For example, some cases limit victim fault to the scheme
adopted in 1965 in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),
which limits the defense of victim fault to situations where the victim
knowingly assumed the risk of the unreasonably defective aspect of a
product.53

The remaining thirty states can be divided into two categories. First,
nineteen states have no authority concerning the issues. 54 In some of these

49. See, e.g., infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
50. These states are: Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.81 (West 2017); Estate of Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1996); Morris v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1160-61 (E.D.
Wash. 2011); Dannenfelser v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098 (D. Haw.
2005); McNeil v. Nissan Motor Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (D.N.H. 2005); Gartman v. Ford
Motor Co., 430 S.W.3d 218, 220-21 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699
A.2d 339, 346 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); Green v. Ford Motor Co., 942 N.E.2d 791, 795-96 (Ind.
2011); Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Iowa 2009); Austin v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 288 (Me. 1984); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349,
357 (N.D. 1984); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 693, 694 (Tenn. 1995);
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 434 (Tex. 1984).
5 1. These states are: Connecticut, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Giannini v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.
Conn. 2007); Gerow v. Mitch Crawford Holidays Motors, 987 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999); Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807, 830 (Neb. 2006); Andrews v. Harley
Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1990); Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205,
214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Gaudio v. Ford Motor Co., 976 A.2d 524, 540 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2009); Donze, 420 S.C. at 20, 800 S.E.2d at 485.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
53. E.g., Day, 345 N.W.2d at 357. See infra notes 147-154 and accompanying text for
discussion of cases addressing victim fault under Section 402A.
54. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Some of these states are sometimes listed as
"majority" states. However, as indicated infra at notes 67-85, 89-93 and accompanying text,
this treatment is based on a failure to analyze these cases accurately. Where a case allows
evidence of fault on the part of the plaintiff, but the relevance of plaintiff fault in a
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states, a statute is arguably broad enough to cover the issue.5 5 However, these
were not included because there was no case interpreting or applying the act
in terms of crashworthiness. 56 Second, eleven states fall into a miscellaneous
category.57
1.

Majority States
a.

Statutory Resolution

The inclusion of comparative negligence as a defense in crashworthiness
cases in many states has been based on a statute. For example, the Florida
statute explicitly includes crashworthiness claims in the comparative
scheme.58 More commonly, courts find that language like "any" and "all"
indicates a legislative intent to include victim fault in causing the initial
collision in apportioning fault for the second collision.59

crashworthiness claim is not raised or addressed, the case is placed in the "no authority"
category. See, e.g., Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1351-54 (10th Cir. 1989)
(applying Wyoming law and ruling that evidence of plaintiffs fault admissible but not
addressing issue raised in Donze).
55. For example, the Kentucky allocation of fault statute includes "all tort actions,
concluding products liability actions, involving fault." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)
(West 2016).
56. This approach was adopted because decisions in states with broad language like "all
claims or actions" sometimes construe the statute narrowly. E.g., Giannini v. Ford Motor Co.,
616 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007) (holding plaintiffs fault in causing initial collision was
irrelevant to crashworthiness claim despite broad statutory language like "all claims or actions,"
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m(b) (2017), and "any claim," id. § 52-572o(a), (b)).
57. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2017). The statute explicitly includes enhanced
injuries in the definitions of "accident" and "products liability action" and provides that
apportionment of damages in enhancement cases shall include "the fault of all persons who
contributed to the accident." Section 2 of the Act adopting this approach states that the intent is
to "overrule D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001), which adopted . .. [the]
minority rule."
59. E.g., Morris v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1160 (E.D.
Wash. 2011) (relying on statutory language "acts and omissions, ... that are in any measure");
McNeil v. Nissan Motor Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 n. 1 (D.N.H. 2005) (relying in part on
language "any plaintiff' in comparative fault statute); Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d
339, 344-45 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (relying on statutory language "all actions"); Green v. Ford
Motor Co., 942 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. 2011) (referring to "expansive language" of Product
Liability Act and Comparative Fault Act); Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550, 560
(Iowa 2009) (noting strict liability included in comparative fault statute and that "legislature has
not provided . .. an exception").
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For example, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that its statute was
sufficiently broad to require comparing the victim's original fault in an
enhanced injury case. 60 A subsequent case relied on this interpretation to
include plaintiff s fault in a crashworthiness case. 6 1The court in this later case
noted:
The comparative-fault statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 1664-122(a) (Repl.2005), provides that, in all actions for personal
injuries or wrongful death in which recovery is predicated on fault,
liability shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a
claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party from whom he
seeks to recover. The statute additionally provides that "fault" shall
include any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty,
or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any
damages sustained by any party. 62
At other times, the decision is based on the use of a broad interpretation
63
For example, in Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 64 a
federal appeals court relied on the broad language of Colorado's products
liability statute to address the issue of whether the plaintiff's fault in the initial
collision applied in a crashworthiness claim. The statute provided: "In any
product liability action, the fault of the person suffering the harm, as well as
the fault of all others who are parties to the action for causing the harm, shall
be compared by the trier of fact in accordance with this section." 65 The court
concluded that the term "fault" was so broad that the plaintiffs fault in the
initial collision was to be compared with the defendant's. 66
of the term "fault."

b.

JudicialDecision

The leading case on the judicial inclusion of the plaintiffs fault in the
initial collision in a crashworthiness case is the 1978 decision of the California

60. See Bishop v. Tariq, Inc., 384 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (enhanced injury
resulting from lack of required safety equipment at swimming pool).
61. Gartman v. Ford Motor Co., 430 S.W.3d 218 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013).
62. Id. at 221.
63. See, e.g., Morris, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-61 (quoting Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
978 P.2d 505, 511 (Wash. 1999)); Green, 942 N.E.2d at 794-95.
64. 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996).
65. Id. at 1419 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406(1) (2017)).
66. Id.

756

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 741

Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp.67 Daly has been viewed
(albeit wrongfully) as being the first case to decide the issue in favor of
including victim's fault in the initial collision. 68 In addition, California had
been a pioneer in the development of strict liability for injuries caused by
defective productS 69 and, to some extent, comparative fault.70 Though many
of the decisions in the majority states have relied on statutes, a number of
these decisions also rely on Daly.7' The five states that have judicially adopted
the majority position often rely extensively on Daly.72 In addition, the
California Court of Appeals relied on Daly to limit an intoxicated victim's
recovery in a crashworthiness case. 73 Unfortunately, this wide use of Daly has
been based on a misreading of the case caused by a failure to note two
important features of the case.
First, the evidentiary details of the case are widely ignored. The parties
generally agreed on the following facts:

67. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
68. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 123-134 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Section
402A).
70. See infra notes 201-202 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of comparative
fault). The California Supreme Court adopted comparative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of
California, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
71. E.g., McNeil v. Nissan Motor Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D.N.H. 2005) (citing
and quoting Daly in process of interpreting comparative fault statute).
72. Dannenfelser v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095-96 (D. Haw.
2005) (noting importance of Daly to development of Hawaiian law); Day v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
345 N.W.2d 349, 353 (N.D. 1984) (citing Daly); Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d
684, 690-91 (Tenn. 1995) (referring to Daly as a "leading case" and quoting extensively from
Daly); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 425-26 (Tex. 1984) (discussing and
quoting from Daly). Daly has also influenced decisions involving statutes. See, e.g., Austin v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 287-88 (Me. 1984) (relying on statute and on Daly).
73. Doupnik v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 Cal. Rptr. 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Doupnik
does not address the facts and holding of Daly. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text
for discussion of the facts and holding of Daly. Instead, the Doupnik opinion contains only the
following language:
General Motors challenges the adequacy of the instructions on legal cause and the
substantiality of the evidence on that issue. The common thread uniting the issues
posed by General Motors has to do with the relative contributions of successive
wrongs, Doupnik's driving off the road and General Motors' defective welds, to the
injury he suffered. With respect to products liability the issue is one of comparative
fault. (See Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp . .
) ..... Cases of concurrent cause "fall
into three groups: in the first both wrongful acts are necessary conditions of the
harm ...
This is a case of the first group, adjusting the doctrine of contributory
negligence to that of comparative fault, as required by Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.,
supra.
275 Cal. Rptr. at 719, 725.
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In the early hours of October 31, 1970, decedent Kirk Daly, a 36year-old attorney, was driving his Opel southbound on the Harbor
Freeway in Los Angeles. The vehicle, while travelling at a speed of
50-70 miles per hour, collided with and damaged 50 feet of metal
divider fence. After the initial impact between the left side of the
vehicle and the fence the Opel spun counterclockwise, the driver's
door was thrown open, and Daly was forcibly ejected from the car
and sustained fatal head injuries .

.

. [H]ad the deceased remained in

the Opel his injuries, in all probability, would have been relatively
minor.74

"The sole theory of plaintiffs' complaint was strict liability for damages
allegedly caused by a defective product, namely, an improperly designed door
latch claimed to have been activated by the impact." 7 5 A proper latch, claimed
plaintiffs, would have reduced Daly's injuries by keeping him within the
Opel. 76

In response, General Motors (GM) introduced evidence "indicating that:
(1) the Opel was equipped with a seat belt-shoulder harness system, and a
door lock, either of which, if used, it was contended, would have prevented
Daly's ejection from the vehicle; (2) Daly used neither the harness system nor
the lock; (3) the 1970 Opel owner's manual contained warnings that seat belts
should be worn and doors locked when the car was in motion for 'accident
security'; and (4) Daly was intoxicated at the time of collision." 7 7 The "jury
was advised [that this evidence] was admitted for the limited purpose of
determining whether decedent had used the vehicle's safety equipment."7 8
The limitation to the use of the "vehicle's safety equipment" is important.
GM was claiming that the crashworthiness system had several components,
including a "seat belt-shoulder system" and a "door lock." 79 Even if the
system should have had a better door latch, these other parts of the system had
to be considered in order to assess crashworthiness and causation. Given this
limitation, it is clear that Daly did not hold that wrongdoing by Daly in causing
the initial accident was to be compared with a defect in crashworthiness. The
entire focus was on Daly's conduct in relation to the secondary collision.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Cal. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id at 1165.
Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original).
Id.
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The second problem is that Daly has not been considered in terms of
historical context. At the time of the decision, the alternative to using
comparative fault in Daly was the use of the "all or nothing" approach of the
common law.8 0 Under this approach, if comparative fault did not apply to
strict liability claims, any assumption of risk by Daly would completely bar
his recovery." Such a result would frustrate the goals of incentivizing safer
design and spreading losses that provided the reasons for adopting strict
liability for defective products.8 2 Therefore, for reasons of "equity and
fairness," 83 a broader approach to comparative fault was adopted.
It is an unfortunate irony that the Daly case, which was intended to further
the goals of strict liability, has been used (or misused, given that negligence
in the initial collision was not at issue)8 4 to support reducing or denying
recovery for plaintiffs. The result is to frustrate the concern of the Daly court
to achieve the accident prevention and loss spreading goals of strict liability. 5
The policy concern of cases like Donze, to maximize the deterrent impact
of liability for defective crashworthiness by a judicial refusal to shift any part
of that liability to the plaintiff or a third party, is not considered in many
cases. 6 For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court simply concluded: (1) A
plaintiff s conduct in causing the initial collision was a proximate cause of an
enhanced injury, and (2) "[t]herefore, it is illogical to hold that comparative
fault applies to products liability actions generally, but does not to 'enhanced
injury' claims." 7 However, as indicated above in the discussion of Justice

80. Id. at 1167. See infra notes 231-236 and accompanying text for discussion of this
approach.
81. Id. at 1169.
82. Id. at 1168-69. See infra notes 326-346 and accompanying text for further discussion
of these goals.
83. Id at 1169.
84. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 155 and accompanying text for discussion of goals to be furthered by
strict liability.
86. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. For an example of another case
stressing the concern for incentivizing manufacturers to address crashworthiness, see, for
example, Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Nev. 1990), which states: "A
major policy behind holding manufacturers strictly liable for failing to produce crashworthy
vehicles is to encourage them to do all they reasonably can do to design a vehicle which will
protect a driver in an accident. Hence, the jury in such a case should focus on whether the
manufacturer produced a defective product, not on the consumer's negligence."
87. Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684, 694 (Tenn. 1995). The Delaware
Superior Court also stated in conclusory terms: "It is obvious that the negligence of a plaintiff
who causes the initial collision is one of the proximate causes of all of the injuries he sustained,
whether limited to those the original collision would have produced or including those enhanced
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Kittredge's concurring opinion in Donze, proximate cause in the sense of legal
causes in a crashworthiness case requires analysis and should not be addressed
"

simply by ipse dixit.8

2.

Miscellaneous

'

As the title to this Section suggests, the states in this category are simply
hard to categorize in terms of the relevance of victims' fault to a crashworthy
claim. Cases from seven states are treated as "not decided" herein because
they involve misuse or nonuse of the safety restraint system in the vehicle.89
As indicated above, 90 this type of fault has nothing to do with the initial
collision. Instead, the nonuse or misuse relates directly to the second collision
and the adequacy of the crashworthiness system provided by the
manufacturer. As a result, it does not involve the initial collision issue
presented in Donze. Analysis of some of these cases can be complicated
because evidence of nonuse of the safety restraint system is often barred by
statute. 9
Because of the failure to recognize the importance of the distinction
concerning victim's fault in the initial collision vis-A1-vis misuse or nonuse of
restraint systems in the second collision, these states are often miscategorized.
For example, Donze lists California, Michigan, and Oregon as majority states
even though they are actually in the "not decided" category. 92 The Products

by a defective product in the second collision." Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 346
(Del. Super. Ct. 1997).
88. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
89. Gen. Motors v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Alaska 1998) (seatbelt misuse);
Watkins v. Hartsock, 783 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Kan. 1989) (noting nonuse or misuse of safety
restraint relevant but upholding exclusion pursuant to statute); Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 410
N.W.2d 706, 707 (Mich. 1987) (failure to use belt); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d
241 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law); Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 816 N.E.2d 1049,
1053 (Ohio 2004) (based on statute concerning admissibility of seatbelt nonuse in crashworthy
cases); Dahl v. Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW), 748 P.2d 77, 79 (Or. 1987). For discussion
of the sixth state, California, see supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text. North Carolina has
also addressed the issue of nonuse of a restraint system. Stark ex rel. Jacobsen v. Ford Motor
Co., 723 S.E.2d 753, 755 (N.C. 2012). Because of other aspects of North Carolina law, this case
is addressed infra at notes 96-99 and accompanying text. See infra notes 468-474 and
accompanying text for discussion of statutory bar of seatbelt evidence in South Carolina.
90. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 89 and infra notes 468-469 and accompanying text.
92. Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 13 n.3, 800 S.E.2d 479, 481 n.3 (2017).
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Liability Restatement includes California, Oregon, and Wyoming in the
majority category. 93
In a case applying New York law, the Second Circuit addressed nonuse
of seatbelts in the crashworthiness context. 94 In addition, the New York Court
of Appeals held that public policy bars a crashworthiness claim by an
intoxicated motorist. 95
North Carolina and Virginia are hard to categorize because they still use
the common law contributory negligence scheme rather than comparative
fault. 96 In addition, neither state has recognized the strict liability in tort claim
for products liability. While both states avoid the explicit adoption of the
crashworthiness doctrine, both allow recovery for enhanced injuries from a
crash caused by negligent crashworthiness design. 97 Finally, neither appears
to have addressed the issue involved in Donze, though a North Carolina
verdict for Ford Motor Company in a claim of defective restraint system was
upheld where the evidence supported a finding of nonuse or misuse of the
system. 98 In addition, a federal district court opinion indicates the view that
North Carolina would totally bar recovery for enhanced injury in a
crashworthiness case. 99
Louisiana appears to use an ad hoc system for addressing victim fault. In
an enhanced injury case involving a defective workplace product, the court
refused to apply comparative fault on policy grounds.' 00 However, a
subsequent crashworthiness case indicates that comparative fault should be
applied in the circumstances involved. 101

93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., Reporters' Note, at 255-56 (AM.
LAW INST. 1997). The inclusion of Wyoming was based on Harvey v. GeneralMotors, 873 F.2d
1343, 1345, 1346 n.1, 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1989), in which the plaintiff was a passenger who
was not wearing a seat belt, was ejected from the vehicle, and suffered severe injuries. The case
is complicated by the fact that plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle, and the fault of the driver
was apparently imputed to the plaintiff/owner. There was also a question of whether plaintiff
had adequately proven the extent of enhanced injuries. The jury found plaintiff and defendant
were each fifty percent at fault and awarded no damages. Because of these complexities,
Wyoming is placed in the undecided category in this Article.
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. Alami v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 766 N.E.2d 574, 577-78 (N.Y. 2002).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7, Reporters' Note,
at 74 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
97. Stark ex rel. Jacobsen v. Ford Motor Co., 723 S.E.2d 753, 758 (N.C. 2012) (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (2011)); Slone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 S.E.2d 51, 53-54 (Va.
1995).
98. Stark ex rel. Jacobsen, 723 S.E.2d at 761.
99. Hinkamp v. Am. Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
100. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985).
101. Moore v. Chrysler Corp., 596 So. 2d 225, 239 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
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West Virginia has a novel approach to products liability. In response to a
certified question, the Supreme Court of Appeals stated that West Virginia
recognized the crashworthiness doctrine.' 02 The court also offered the
following holding: "[F]or the guidance of both the state and federal trial
courts, we hold today that in any crashworthiness case where there is a split
of authority on any issue, as for example the plaintiffs burden of proof
discussed above, we adopt the rule that is most liberal to the plaintiff."1 03
Arguably, this guidance supports placing West Virginia in the group of states
that refuse to consider the victim's negligence involved in the initial collision
in a crashworthiness case.
III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A.

Restatements ofLaw

The discussion of Products Liability will be structured in terms of three
successive Restatements of Torts. The Apportionment ofLiability Restatement
will be used in addressing comparative fault. Therefore, it is helpful to review
the nature and role of the American Law Institute (ALI), which produces the
Restatements. The ALI was founded in 1923 to address the uncertainty and
complexity in American law.' 04 "[T]he law's uncertainty stemmed in part
from a lack of agreement on fundamental principles of common law, while
the law's complexity was attributed to the numerous variations within
different jurisdictions of the United States."'0 o The Institute's charter states
that its mission is "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law

102. Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 782 (W. Va. 1991).
103. Id. at 786. The court gave the following reasoning for its position:
Our conclusion today to adopt the rule most favorable to the plaintiff in
crashworthiness cases is based upon the same actuarial considerations that have
prompted us finally to adopt the doctrine of crashworthiness-namely, that we are
already paying for full coverage. Indeed, in some world other than the one in which
we live, where this Court were called upon to make national policy, we might very
well take a meat ax to some current product liability rules. Therefore, we do not claim
that our adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs comports, necessarily, with some
Platonic ideal of perfect justice. Rather, for a tiny state incapable of controlling the
direction of the national law in terms of appropriate trade-offs among employment,
research, development, and compensation for the injured users of products, the
adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs is simple self-defense.
Id.
104. Creation, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/creation/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2018).
105. Id.
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and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."10 6
The ALI describes Restatements as follows:
Restatements are primarily addressed to courts and aim to clear
formulations of common law and its statutory elements, and reflect
the law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a
court. Although Restatements aspire toward the precision of statutory
language, they are also intended to reflect the flexibility and capacity
of development and growth of the common law. That is why they are
phrased in descriptive terms of a judge announcing the law to be
applied in a given case rather than in the mandatory terms of a
statute. 107
The primary work of a Restatement project is done by Reporters, who
"structure the project, prepare drafts, and present drafts ... for discussion.
Most Reporters are law professors."' 0 Because of the problems of uncertainty
and complexity, preparing a Restatement presents several challenges.
First, from a descriptive point of view, regardless of doctrine, there is
virtually no "common law" that is common to all the states. As a result, there
will be, at best, a majority view, a minority view, and a group of states in the
category of "other"-for example, states that have not addressed an issue.1 09
Moreover, states may agree on a substantive rule but disagree, for example,
on who has the burden of proof on design defect." 0 Finally, many issues may
have been addressed by statute rather than judicial opinion. In short, clarifying
and simplifying the common law in our federal system can be, at best, a
somewhat quixotic task. At times, like any collective endeavor that imposes a
single rule in the context of disagreement concerning ends and means,
comparisons to sausage making may be appropriate."

106. Id.
107. How the Institute Works, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/howinstitute-works/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., supra notes 49-103 and accompanying text (discussing majority and
minority views concerning admissibility of plaintiffs' fault in crashworthiness cases).

110. Compare, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978) (burden
on defendant if plaintiff shows design caused the injury), with e.g., Branham v. Ford Motor Co.,

390 S.C. 203, 226, 701 S.E.2d 5, 17 (2010) (burden on plaintiff).
111. See, e.g., Robert Pear, If Only Laws Were Like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/weekinreview/05pear.html.
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This situation raises a second challenge: is the goal to be simply
descriptive or is it to go further and take a normative position concerning
disagreement and uncertainty? Not surprisingly, there are not only
disagreements concerning the descriptive versus normative roles of
Restatements but also good arguments for both sides.112
Regardless of one's view on this issue, the increasing importance of
Restatements as persuasive authorities has led to increased efforts to shape
their content and to a concern that the Restatement project has become
politicized.11 3 Though such concerns have not been limited to the tort

In defending their work, members of Congress love to repeat a quotation attributed to
Otto von Bismarck: "If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either
one being made" .... In many ways, that quotation is offensive to sausage makers;
their process is better controlled and more predictable.
112. See, e.g., V. William Scarpato, "Is" v. "Ought," or How ILearned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Restatement, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 413 (2013). For a more general review of the
operation of the ALI in adopting Restatements, see Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror:
The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REv. 205 (2007).
113. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing InstitutionalMemories: Wisconsin and
the American Law Institute-The FairchildLecture, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1, 24 (1995) (noting the
"increasing influence of the Institute and the controversial nature of its projects serve to
compound the problem" of objectivity vis-A-vis self-interest).
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Restatements,'1 4 the Products Liability Restatement generated an unusually
large amount of such criticism"' and of responses to criticism.116
B. ProductsLiability: Imposing "CorporateResponsibility"
1.

FirstRestatement of Torts

At the beginning of the twentieth century, persons injured by defective
products faced a substantial hurdle in recovering for their injuries because
recovery was limited to those in "privity of contract" with the manufacturer." 7
In the landmark case of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.,"8 Justice Cardozo
laid "the foundation for the modem era of products liability law"119 by

114.E.g., Charles Silver, The Lost World: OfPoliticsand Getting the Law Right, 26 Hofstra
L. Rev. 773, 774, 799 (1998); Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck's Sausages and the ALI's
Restatements, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 817 (1998) (discussing Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers (Am. Law Inst. 1986)).
115. E.g., Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the
Demise ofthe ConsumerExpectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227 (1997); Douglas
A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); Jerry J. Phillips,
Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047 (2002); Andrew F. Popper, Tort Reform Policy
More Than State Law Dominates Section 2 ofthe Third Restatement, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
38 (1998); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 703-05 (2008) (criticizing the Restatement (Third) of
ProductsLiability for defense bias and harmful impacts on "consumer protection and corporate
responsibility"); Marshall S. Shapo, ProductsLiability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761
(1998); Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft Restatement of Products
Liability, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 215 (1997); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); Frank J.
Vandall, The American Law Institute is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1998);
Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and the
Reinstatement ofLiability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889 (2005) (reviewing continued
support for strict liability and expectation test in design defect cases); Note, Just Uhat You'd
Expect: Professor Henderson'sRedesign ofProductsLiability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2381
(1998). For further discussion of this criticism, see infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., Reporters' Note, at 81-83 (AM.
LAW INST. 1997); James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products
Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667 (1998); Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability-The American Law Institute's Processof Democracy and
Deliberation,26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743 (1998). Henderson and Twerski were the Reporters for
the ProductsLiability Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., XV-XVII
(AM. LAW INST. 1997).
117. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.2, at 20-21 (3d ed. 2015).
118. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
119. OWEN, supra note 117,§ 1.2, at 21.
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replacing the privity limit in favor of a negligence approach based on
foreseeability of harm.' 20
Building on MacPhersonand subsequent cases, Section 395 of the First
Torts Restatement provides:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of chattel which, unless carefully made, he should
recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial
bodily harm to those who lawfully use it for a purpose for which it is
manufactured and to those whom the supplier should expect to be in
the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for
which it is manufactured.121

Though this section recognizes a claim in negligence, it limits that claim
to harm resulting from "lawful" risks of "substantial bodily harm" caused by
"a purpose for which" the product was manufactured.
2.

Second Restatement of Torts
a.

Adoption

Section 395 of the Second Torts Restatement is virtually a verbatim
version of the same section in the First Torts Restatement.122 The Second

120. The holding in MacPherson was stated as follows:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of
the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a
duty to make it carefully.
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 395

(AM. LAW INST. 1934). Sections 388-394,

396, 399-408 addressed a variety of other situations involving harm caused by chattels. Section
400 of the First Torts Restatement imposed liability on a person who sold a product made by
another as if it were his own product, regardless of whether that person was negligent, if the
product had not been made in compliance with the rules set forth in Sections 394 to 398. Section
397 imposed a duty of due care on manufacturers utilizing a secret formula, and Section 398
imposed liability for failure to use reasonable care in the adoption of a plan or design. These
were viewed as special applications to Section 395. Id. § 397 cmt. a; id. § 398 cmt. a.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 395

(AM. LAW INST. 1965). Sections 397

(secret formula) and 398 (design) also parallel the First Torts Restatement. As with the First
Torts Restatement, other sections addressed additional rules concerning chattels. Id. §§ 388394, 396, 399-404.
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Torts Restatement also added two new provisions concerning products.
Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Section 402B provides:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by
him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation,
even though
(1) It is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(2) The consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
These sections impose liability regardless of whether negligence or fraud was
involved.
Section 402A is a clear example of using a Restatement in a normative
rather than descriptive manner. William L. Prosser was the Reporter for the
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Second Torts Restatement.1 23 He was also Dean of Berkeley Law School for
thirteen years, 124 "the foremost torts authority of [the] time,"1 25 and the author
of the torts treatise, which was often cited simply as Prosser on Torts126 and
has been described as "the most influential treatise ever published in tort
law."

127

In 1960, Prosser wrote an article arguing that the strict liability scheme
which applied to food should be applied to products generally.1 28 As he was
drafting the Second Torts Restatement, Prosser gradually extended the
generally recognized rule of strict liability for foods to all products, even
though there was very little authority for this extension.1 29 Just before the
adoption of Section 402A in 1964, the California Supreme Court decided
Greenman v. Yuba PowerProducts, Inc.,1 30 which adopted "strict liability" as
the test for tort liability for injuries caused by product defects. The author of
the unanimous opinion in Greenman was Chief Justice Roger Traynor, who
had argued for strict liability in a concurring opinion in a case decided in
1944,131 and who was one of the advisors for the Second Tort Restatement.132

Among the authorities cited in Greenman were Traynor's 1944 concurring
opinion and Prosser's 1960 article.1 33 In 1966, Prosser declared victory by
publishing an article that declared the fall of the citadel of priority of contract
and negligence to the new regime of strict liability. 134

123. Id. at III.
124. Kenneth S. Abraham, Prosser'sThe Fall of the Citadel, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1823,
1824 (2016).
125. Id.
126. E.g., Micklev. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 223, 166 S.E.2d 173, 181 (1969); Abraham,
supra note 124, at 1824.
127. Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and
IntellectualHistory, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577 (2010).
128. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1966).
129. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 793 n.9 (1966); Denis W. Stearns, Prosser'sBait-and-Switch: How Food
Safety Was Sacrificed in the Battlefor Tort's Empire, 15 NEV. L.J. 106, 121-31, 136-39 (2014).
130. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963).
131. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, at III (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
133. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
134. Prosser, supra note 129, at 791.
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Application
i.

The "tests"for defect

Applying Section 402A was a challenge for courts because the language
and comments to Section 402A could support two different "tests" of product
defect. First, there is support for the view that the test of defect is determined
by reference to normal (common, ordinary, reasonable) consumer
expectations.'35 If the danger exceeds such expectations, then the product is
"unreasonably dangerous." Second, the language "unreasonably dangerous"
in Section 402A(1) parallels traditional negligence terminology, and one
comment to the section uses cost-benefit analysis like that in negligence to
define defective. 136
This lack of clarity was important. Without a test to define the duty
imposed on sellers, it is not possible to: (1) determine the nature and scope of
sellers' duty to protect potential victims, or (2) identify the ways in which a
seller's duty under the strict liability approach varies from negligence. In the
decades following the adoption of Section 402A, numerous approaches were
developed to resolve these problems. Summarizing or analyzing these
approaches is beyond the scope of this Article.1 37 Therefore, because
California was the leader in adopting strict liability, this Article will use the
California experience to illustrate one possibility.
The California Supreme Court had decided the path-breaking Greenman
case 38 and, in a later case, had rejected the use of the phrase "unreasonably
dangerous" because it "rings of negligence."1 39 California also adopted the
view that the choice of test depended upon the circumstances. Under this
approach, "the consumer expectations test is reserved for [design defect] cases
in which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion
that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions and is thus
defective regardlessof expert opinion about the merits of the design."140 (In
effect, this decision simply reflects the basic rule for opinion evidence by lay

135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g, h, i, j (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
136. Id. § 402A cmt. k (discussing drugs). For an example of cost-benefit analysis in a
negligence case, see Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 243, 166 S.E.2d 173, 192 (1969).
137. For a summary of the variety of approaches, see, for example, OWEN, supranote 117,
§§ 5.3-5.10.
138. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
139. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62 (Cal. 1972).
140. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
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persons.)141 Where the expectation test is not appropriate, a negligence type
cost-benefit approach utilizing expert testimony is used for design defects.1 42
In order to go beyond the cost-benefit approach used in the traditional
negligence framework, California adopted an approach for design defects
that: (1) shifts the burden of going forward and of persuasion to the defendant
if the "plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused
[the] injury," and (2) uses a test that "explicitly focuses the trier of fact's
attention on the adequacy of the product itself, rather than on the
manufacturer's conduct."1 43 Given this focus on the product,
... the fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an
attempt to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a reasonably
prudent manufacturer would have under the circumstances, while
perhaps absolving the manufacturer of liability under a negligence
theory, will not preclude the imposition of liability under strict
liability principles if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that
the product's design is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders. 144
Thus, the strict liability cost-benefit test is applied on the basis of what is
known at the time of trial rather than by the "state of the art," which is often
viewed as what is known or reasonably knowable at the time of design.145
Warning defects are treated differently. California allows defendants in
warning defect cases to "present evidence of the state of the art, i.e., evidence
that the particular risk was neither known nor knowable by the application of
scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture and/or
distribution."1 46

141. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 701. This rule states:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited
to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness's perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact
in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of [expert testimony under] Rule 702.
142. Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
143. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
144. Id. at 457.
145. For development of the concept of state of the art, see OWEN, supra note 117, § 10.4.
For discussion of other states following the California "time of trial" approach, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, Reporters' Note, at 83-84 (AM. LAW INST.
1997).
146. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (1991).
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ii.

The defense of voluntarily
encountering a known danger

and

unreasonably

Comment n to Section 402A notes:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability . .. [c]ontributory
negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense..., [but] the form of
contributory negligence which consists in voluntary and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger ... passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense . . . .147
The treatment of this language has varied. Some jurisdictions still view
unreasonable assumption of risk as a total bar, while others include it in
comparative fault.1 48 In addition, the approach to a victim's fault other than
assumption of risk varies. Some jurisdictions include all forms of fault,
including contributory negligence,1 49 while others only recognize assumption
of risk as a defense.'o In addition, courts vary in their application of the
doctrine to the facts involved.' More specifically, some courts require only
a generalized awareness of risk 5 2 while others require knowledge and

147. Comment n provides:
n. Contributorynegligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is
not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or
to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of
contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding
to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption
of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user
or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1997). For general discussion
of assumption of risk, see infra notes 218-230 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 369, at 1020-26 (2000); OWEN,
supra note 117, § 13.4, at 806-24 (discussing treatment).
149. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1020-23.
150. E.g., Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984).
151. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1020-26 (discussing variations); OWEN, supra
note 117, § 13.4, at 806-26 (discussing variations).
152. E.g., Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("awareness of
the danger of injury" sufficient).
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appreciation of the specific risks involved,' 53 including specific risks from a
crashworthiness defect. 154
c.

Policy

Even if Section 402A did not provide an adequate test of defect, it
reframed the development of products liability law by focusing on the need
for a new approach to achieving improved safety for consumers, users, and
bystanders. The basis for this strict liability approach is stated in the following
language:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility
toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by
it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products. 5 5

153. E.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hickox, 59 A.3d 1267, 1274 (D.C. Ct. App.
2013); Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 257 P.3d 383, 390 (Mont. 2011); Rahmig v. Mosley
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 74-75 (Neb. 1987); Wangsness v. Builders Cashway, Inc., 779
N.W.2d 136, 140-41 (S.D. 2010).
154. Cota v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 684 P.2d 888, 893-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A

cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The policy

concerns underlying Section 402A were initially expressed in 1944 in the following selection
from Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150
P.2d 436, 443-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted):
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets
and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and
consumer of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable
secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.
The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up
confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-marks. Consumers no
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In short, the manufacturer has a "special responsibility" because it is in
the best position to reduce injuries efficiently and, where appropriate, avoid
lump sum losses for victims by spreading accident costs among consumers.
3.

Third Restatement: ProductsLiability

Products liability law had an "explosive expansion ... after the adoption
of Section 402A." 5 6 Though Section 402A obviously had a major role in this
expansion,'5 7 it is hard to measure that impact because a number of factors
influenced the expansion of products liability. For example, the negligence
claim recognized in Section 395 of the First and Second Torts Restatements
was also involved because many claims were based on negligence rather than
(or in addition to) a Section 402A claim.'15 Moreover, many states were using
some version of a negligence type of approach rather than strict liability to

&

longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying on the reputation
of the manufacturer or the trade mark. Manufacturers have sought to justify that faith
by increasingly high standards of inspection and a readiness to make good on
defective products by way of replacements and refunds. The manufacturer's
obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between
them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product has become so
complicated as to require one or more intermediaries. Certainly there is greater reason
to impose liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but a conduit of a
product that he is not himself able to test.
156. David G. Owen, ProductsLiability Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 278 (1998).
157. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 117, at 270 ("Tort law has probably never witnessed such
a rapid, widespread, and altogether explosive change in a rule and theory of legal
responsibility."); Scarpato, supra note 112, at 414; Wolfram, supra note 114, at 820 (noting that
Section 402A "can fairly be described as launching . . . the products liability field of litigation").
Scarpato notes:
[S]ection 402A has been cited more than any other restatement section ever published,
enjoying a seismic effect in the area of products liability. State courts adopted the
Restatement provision at a shocking rate, surprising even Dean Prosser, who had
predicted a period of up to fifty years before it would become the dominant viewpoint.
Scarpato, supra note 112, at 414.
158. OWEN, supra note 117, § 1.3, at 26. Owen summarizes a 1985-1986 study of theories
used in products liability claims as follows: "Strict liability was the only theory alleged in 22%
of the claims; only negligence in 15%; and only breach of warranty in 3%. All three theories of
liability were alleged in 30% of the claims. Strict liability was the main theory relied upon in
settlement in 60% of the cases, negligence in 310%, and warranty in 8%." Id. As a practical
matter, plaintiffs' attorneys often prefer a verdict based on negligent wrongdoing rather than
strict liability because of a common belief that the amount of a verdict might be higher if
wrongdoing caused the injury. For empirical support of this belief, see Richard L. Cupp
Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical
Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874 (2002).
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address design and warning defects.' 59 In addition, changes in the plaintiffs
bar, in terms of things like case selection and preparation, probably played a
role in the change.1 60

a.

Defect

The understanding of the nature and complexity of claims of product
defect increased in the decades following the adoption of Section 402A. In
particular, it became clear that there were three distinct categories of defect:
manufacturing, design, and instructions/warnings. Consequently, Section 2 of
the Products Liability Restatement provides:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised
in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.

159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, Reporters' Note, cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1997) (reviewing case law in support of section); Henderson & Twerski, supra note
116, at 673 n.11 ("The case law supporting the [negligence] risk:utility defect as the standard
for design defect is overwhelming."). Henderson and Twerski were the Reporters for the
ProductsLiability Restatement.
160. OWEN, supra note 117,§ 1.3, at 27.

774

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

b.

[VOL. 69: 741

Strict Liability

Pockets of strict liability remain in the Products Liability Restatement.
As indicated above, Section 2(a) imposes strict liability for manufacturing
defects. 161 As a result, it does not matter whether due care had been used in
trying to discover and repair such defects. 162 Several reasons were given in
support of this strict liability approach: (1) it creates a better system of safety
incentives; (2) it promotes spreading of costs; (3) it reduces administrative
costs by eliminating the issue of fault; and (4) the conscious choice of a level
of quality control entails a deliberate choice to accept a particular amount of
injury. 163
Another example of strict liability is the imposition in Section 2 of
liability for injury caused by a product defect on all persons "engaged in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing the defective product."1 64 The
reason for including all sellers/distributors in the chain of distribution is to
"assure plaintiffs access to a responsible and solvent product seller or
distributor."1

65

Finally, Section 9 adopts the approach of Section 402B1 66 of the Second
Torts Restatement and provides:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes a
fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact
concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the misrepresentation.

161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a, at 14-15 (AM. LAW INST.

1997).
162. Id. at 15.
163. Id. at 14-15.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.

§

I cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1997);

id. § 2 cmt. o. Technically, because of the need for plaintiff to show a wrongful defect caused
by someone in the chain of distribution, it would be more accurate to view this approach as a
form of vicarious liability for the wrong of another. For example, such vicarious liability is
involved where employers are vicariously liable for the wrongs of their employees. However, at
this point in time, the term "strict liability" is so widely used that a change in terms is not likely.
165. Id. § 1 cmt. e; see, e.g., OWEN, supra note 117, at 441-45 (discussing reasons for
strict liability).
166. Id. § 9 cmt. a. Section 402B is quoted supra in text following note 122.
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The reason given for strict liability in this instance is that case law has
followed the approach of Section 402B.16 7
c.

Negligence

Under Section 2, design defects and instruction/warning defects, which
are far more common than manufacturing defects,1 68 are no longer subject to
strict liability. Instead, liability is based on negligence. Sellers are not liable
unless the plaintiff can show that, based on the state of the art at that time of
design or warning, 169 the omission of a reasonable alternative design or of a
particular instruction/warning rendered the product not reasonably safe. 7 0
Though consumer expectations may relate to issues like foreseeability,171 they
do not constitute an independent standard for or a determinative role in
judging defectiveness. 172
There is considerable case support for the position that this negligence
type of cost-benefit approach to design and instructions/wamings defects
reflects the majority view. 17' However, there is also considerable support for
the view that the ProductsLiabilityRestatement overstates the adoption of the
cost-benefit approach and fails to adequately recognize the continuing use of
expanded liability approaches, including, for example, the use of consumer
expectations as a test, 174 the use of knowledge at the time of trial, " and the

167. Id. For a discussion of the policy basis for this strict liability, see Baxter v. FordMotor
Co., 12 P.2d 409, 461-63 (Wash. 1932), which is the classic case for this tort. For a somewhat
critical discussion of the basis for this claim, see OWEN, supra note 117, at 132-34.
168. OWEN, supra note 117, at 26.
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a, at 16 (AM. LAW INST.
1997); id. § 2 cmt. d.
170. Id. § 2 cmt. a, at 23-25.
171. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. For an example of judicial disagreement
concerning the dominance of a negligence approach, see, for example, Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (Md. Ct. App. 2002) (The view that Section 2 reflects the
majority position "is not universally shared, however, and, to the extent it is shared, it has been
criticized as representing an unwanted ascendancy of corporate interests under the guise of tort
reform."). For a recent case rejecting the approach of the Products Liability Restatement and
reaffirming a commitment to the consumer expectation test, see Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402
P.2d 649 (Nev. 2017).
175. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text (discussing California cases). For
examples of other states using these approaches, see, for example, Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935
P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., Reporters' Note, at
83-84 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
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shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant when using the cost-benefit
test. 176
The ProductsLiability Restatement also has a somewhat ad hoc approach
to the use of negligence vis-A-vis strict liability.
For example, the
justifications for imposing strict liability for manufacturing defects, for
misrepresentation, and for sellers in the chain of distribution 7 7 would also
support using California's time-of-trial standard for design defect. 78
However, the ProductsLiability Restatement uses the state of the art approach
instead. 179
d.

Crashworthiness

The Products Liability Restatement recognizes a claim for defective
crashworthiness'so and adopts the majority position concerning plaintiffs
fault in causing the initial collision.'" The liability of third party defendants
is determined by the "applicable rules of joint and several liability."18 2
One commentator notes that the Products Liability Restatement
"addresses this issue ambiguously"' 8 3 and summarizes the adoption of these
provisions as follows:
The Reporters favored a rule excluding evidence of driver fault in
crashworthiness cases, cogently explained in an early draft comment
that the American Law Institute Council tentatively approved and
presented to the general membership for consideration in 1994. But
the defense bar membership had been forewarned, and a polished
brief was presented to the Institute advocating the other way. Despite
an impassioned explanation by the Reporters of the logic of their

176. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text (discussing California cases).
177. See supra notes 163, 165, 167 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
181. Id. § 17. Comment d to Section 17 states that, in comparing fault, " . . . how much
responsibility to attribute to a plaintiff will vary with the circumstances. The seriousness of the
plaintiffs fault and the nature of the product defect are relevant in apportioning the appropriate
percentages of responsibility between the plaintiff and the product seller." Comment f to Section
17 states: "In apportioning responsibility in such cases, it may be important that requiring a
product to be designed reasonably to prevent increased harm aims to protect persons in
circumstances in which they are unable to protect themselves."
182. Id. § 16(d).
183. OWEN, supra note 117, at 1086.
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view, a slight majority of the membership voted to deny the
Reporters' exemption of driver fault from apportionment of enhanced
injuries in crashworthiness cases. Dutifully deleting this injury
exception from the comments to the apportionment rule, together
with the relevant portion of their persuasive Reporters' Note, the
Reporters artfully redrafted the pertinent comment to leave wiggle
room for courts in appropriate cases to apportion enhanced injuries
in toto to manufacturers of uncrashworthy vehicles. 84
4.

South Carolina"'

As the discussion of the Mickle decision in Donze indicates, 8 6 South
Carolina judicially recognized the common law negligence action set forth in
Section 395 of the Firstand Second Tort Restatements.'8 7 In contrast, unlike
most states, the strict liability claim in tort was adopted legislatively in South
Carolina.' Instead, the legislature enacted a statute in 1974 containing
language that is virtually verbatim to Section 402A. 8 9 The statute also

184. Id. at 1086-88. Language from the final redrafted version of comment f to Section 16
is quoted supra note 181. For language of the original version of comment f, see OWEN, supra
note 117, at 1087 n. 220. Owen favors the inclusion of plaintiffs fault adopted in the final
version. Id. at 1088-89; infra notes 363-371 and accompanying text.
185. For a more complete discussion of South Carolina products liability law, see
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at Chapter 4.
186. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for Donze discussion. See supra notes
121, 122 and accompanying text for discussion of Section 395.
187. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 117, § 5.3, at 269-77.
188. See Hatfield v. Atlas Enter., Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 248, 262 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1980)
(holding that "strict liability in tort, imposed as a result of a product's defective condition, did
not emerge until" the statute was adopted).
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Effective June 14, 2000, section 15-73-40 was added to the strict products liability scheme. This
statutory provision prohibits recovery for the defective design of firearms and ammunition shells
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provided that the comments "to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second,
are incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legislative intent of this
chapter."' 90
The intended effect of the statute is to relieve the plaintiff of the
requirement of proof of negligence and to render immaterial the
demonstration of due care by the defendant.' 9' However, the South Carolina
courts faced the same problems of applying the "tests" of 402A and of
distinguishing strict liability from negligence that other jurisdictions faced. 192
As a result, with respect to some kinds of defect, and perhaps with respect to
certain defenses, it is not clear that strict liability under the statute is as "strict"
as might first appear.1 93
The statute also follows the scheme of Section 402A in its treatment of
the fault of a victim. Comment n to Section 402A states that contributory
negligence is not a defense but that unreasonable assumption of risk is a
defense. 194 The South Carolina statute states: "If the user or consumer
discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery."'95
Given the legislative adoption of Section 402A, the approach of the
Products Liability Restatement might seem irrelevant to South Carolina
products liability law. However, Branham v. FordMotor Co.1 96 rejected the

consumer expectations test in design defect cases in favor of the cost-benefit
test of the Products Liability Restatement. This decision was based on the
ground that "the Legislature's foresight in looking to the American Law
Institute for guidance in this area is instructive" and that "the Legislature has
expressed no intention to foreclose consideration of developments in products
liability law." 197 Thus, it appears that the Third Torts Restatement may play a

&

based on risk-benefit analysis and requires proof based on the consumer expectation test. Other
states have also adopted Section 402A by statute.
An injured victim could also bring a claim for breach of warranty. See, e.g., HUBBARD
FELIX, supra note 38, at 285-301, 346-50. Such claims are not addressed herein.
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (2005).
191. See, e.g., Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 539, 540, 462 S.E.2d321, 326 (Ct.
App. 1995); Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985).
192. See supra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
193. HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 38, at 321-40, 344-46.
194. See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text.
195. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (2005).
196. Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010).
197. Branham, 390 S.C. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14. There is no mention in Branham of S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-40 (2005), which requires the use of the consumer expectation test and
prohibits the use of a cost-benefit test where guns and ammunition are involved.
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significant role in South Carolina products liability law. Some of the questions
raised by this possibility will be addressed at Section IV.A below.
C.

ComparativeFault:Seeking "Fairness"

The shift to comparative fault has been based on the desire for fairness in
allocating liability and the concern that defendant wrongdoers should not
totally escape liability where a plaintiff was at fault to any extent. 9 8 The shift
was felt necessary because the common law apportioned liability between
plaintiffs and defendants and among defendants on the basis of the all-ornothing approach that imposed total liabilities on the plaintiff or defendant
even if both had been at fault.1 99
The unfairness of this harsh approach was widely criticized. 200 However,
until the late 1960s, only a few states had changed their approach by adopting
some form of comparative fault. 201 Thereafter, comparative schemes were

198. E.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser's
critique of the common law system was as follows:
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is
readily apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two
are, by hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the defendant has played no less a
part in causing the damage; the plaintiff s deviation from the community standard of
conduct may even be relatively slight, and the defendant's more extreme; the injured
man is in all probability, for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two to
bear the financial burden of his loss; and the answer of the law to all this is that the
defendant goes scot free of all liability, and the plaintiff bears it all. Nor is it any
answer to say that the contributory negligence rule promotes caution by making the
plaintiff responsible for his own safety. It is quite as reasonable to say that it
encourages negligence, by giving the defendant reason to hope that he will escape the
consequences. Actually any such idea of deterrence is quite unrealistic. In the usual
case, the negligence on both sides will consist of mere inadvertence or inattention, or
an error in judgment, and it is quite unlikely that forethought of any legal liability will
in fact be in the mind of either party. No one supposes that an automobile driver, as
he approaches an intersection, is in fact meditating upon the golden mean of the
reasonable man of ordinary prudence, and the possibility of tort damages, whether for
himself or for another.
199. See infra notes 231-236 and accompanying text.
200. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 148, at 504; Frank E. Maloney, From Contributive to
Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958); William L.
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 477-80 (1953); Ernest A. Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 198 (1950).
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 6, Reporters' Note,
at 73-74 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); DOBBS, supra note 148, at 503-04; MARC A. FRANKLIN ET
AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 438 (9th ed. 2011); PROSSER,
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increasingly adopted, and by 1990, the majority of states had adopted some
form of comparative fault for allocating liability between plaintiff and
defendants by statute or judicial decision.202
At this point, a similar pattern began to emerge in the treatment of
multiple wrongdoers who had combined in some way to cause the plaintiff s
harm. The common law rule was that each of these "joint tortfeasors" could
be held solely liable for all the harm suffered by the plaintiff.203 This sole
liability scheme was increasingly replaced by diverse comparative schemes
for allocating a proportionate share to each wrongdoer.204
1.

The "Fault"Spectrum

Because of the diversity of items included in many comparative
schemes,205 "comparative fault" is an unfortunate misnomer for many current
approaches to allocating injury costs between plaintiffs and defendants and
among defendants. Better terms might be comparative allocation or
apportionment of liability or comparative responsibility for damages. The title
of the Apportionment ofLiabilityRestatement is an example of the use of such
broader terms.
This Article addresses this terminological problem by adopting the view
that a broad concept of "fault" can be applied to many situations to determine
how to allocate liability. More specifically, "fault" can be applied to a
spectrum of "wrongful" conduct, ranging from intent, to recklessness, to
negligence, and to strict liability.

supra note 198,

§ 67.

Admiralty and some federal statutes concerning interstate commerce

allowed comparative fault. Prosser, supra note 200, at 477-80.
&

202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 6, Reporters' Note,
at 73-74 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1077-78; F. Patrick Hubbard
Robert L. Felix, ComparativeNegligence in South Carolina:Implementing Nelson v. Concrete
Supply Co., 43 S.C. L. REV. 273, 329-43 (1992).
203. See infranotes 237-244 and accompanying text for further discussion of this doctrine.
204. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 (AM.

LAW INST. 2000); Hubbard & Felix, supra note 202, at 329-43; infra notes 256-263 and
accompanying text. The "tort reform" movement also played a role. See infra notes 307-314
and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §§ 1, 3, 5-6,
8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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IntentionalActs

An intentional act can be defined as acting "with the intent to produce a
consequence if (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that
consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is
substantially certain to result."206
b.

Recklessness

Recklessness exists where "(a) the person knows of the risk of harm
created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to another in
the person's situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce
the risk involves burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk
as to render the person's failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the
person's indifference to the risk." 207 Reckless acts can also be defined as
"doing a negligent act knowingly" or as actions which are "willful" or
"wanton."

208

c.

Negligence

"A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances." 209 "Reasonable care" can be defined as acting
like a reasonable person would act under the circumstanceS 2 10 or failing to
take safety precautions where such precautions are less costly than the amount
of harm likely to occur. 211

206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
207. Id. § 2.
208. See, e.g., Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 287-88, 709 S.E.2d 607, 612 (2011);
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 70-72.
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
210. See id § 3 cmt. a; HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 65-70.
211. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1997)
("[P]rimary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable
care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the
risk of harm."); id. § 2(b) cmt. d, at 19 (addressing design defects); id. § 2(b) cmt. f, at 22-23
(same); id. § 2(b) cmt. g, at 27 (same); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 63-65 (discussing
role of cost-benefit analysis).
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Strict Liability

The term "strict liability" generally applies where liability is imposed
even though the conduct was not intentional, reckless, or negligent,212 all of
which fit the normal usage of the term "fault" as wrongful conduct "based on
blameworthiness in a moral sense." 21 3 How can fault be compared with strict
liability, which does not involve blameworthy actions? Courts and legislatures
have answered (or avoided) this question by referring to a need for "the
attainment of a just and equitable result," by a shift in terminology to
"equitable apportionment or allocation of loss," and by a faith in the jury's
214
ability to achieve a just and equitable result.
Most comparative schemes use this approach to include strict liability for
defective products in their comparative scheme. 215 The Apportionment of
Liability Restatement also views comparative fault as appropriate for strict
liability, including strict products liability. 216 Such inclusion is one reason the
ALI chose the term "Apportionment of Liability" for addressing comparative
fault. As indicated above, there are pockets of strict liability in products
liability in the Products Liability Restatement even though most situations
217
involve negligence analysis.

Another important area of strict liability involves conduct by plaintiffs.
The doctrine of "implied assumption of risk" provides a defense to a tort claim
for negligence, recklessness, or strict liability if the plaintiff encounters a risk
with knowledge of the nature and extent of that risk. 218 Though a specific

212. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 20-25 (AM. LAW INST.
1997) (addressing four doctrines where such liability is imposed, scope of liability, and
comparative responsibility where strict liability is involved).
213. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Cal. 1978).
214. E.g., id. at 1168, 1172-73.
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1, Reporters' Note,
at 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
216. Id. § 1, Reporters' Note, cmt. b, j; Hubbard & Felix, supra note 202, at 341-43.
217. See supra notes 161-179 and accompanying text.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496A, 496C, 496D (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
The risks from recklessness and strict liability are included in the types of risk that may be
assumed. Implied assumption of risk is sometimes divided into two types: primary and
secondary. Primary involves those risks that are inherent in an activity and is treated as an issue
of "whether the defendant's legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff."
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 508 S.E.2d 565,
570 (1998). Secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense that focuses on the plaintiff s
conduct. Id at 82, 508 S.E.2d at 571. For discussion of assumption of risk in the context of
Section 402A of the Second Torts Restatement, see supra notes 147-154 and accompanying
text.
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instance of assumption of risk can also be negligent, negligence is not
necessary for the encountering of the risk to be negligent; reasonable risks are
also included in the defense. 219

Though the basis of this strict liability is not always clear, it appears to be
based on the ancient maxim, ' Volenti nonfit injuria'(which signifies that "No
wrong is done to one who consents"). 220 From this perspective, the doctrine
is viewed as fair because it makes a person liable for his or her deliberate
choices, and thus fosters freedom and imposes accountability by barring a
shift of the cost of injuries from individual choices to other persons. 22 1
An initial problem with this asserted fairness is that the consent is implied
rather than explicitly voluntary. More specifically, the reasonable choice to
encounter a risk imposed by defendants' negligence, rather than take an even
less desirable alternative, is treated as a legally binding choice to accept any
injuries that result. There is a doctrine of express (or explicit contractual)
assumption of risk which totally bars recovery from the risk.222 However, such
contracts are construed narrowly 223 and barred in certain situations. 224

Unlike express assumption of risk, the implied "acceptance" of the loss
of the right to injuries resulting from the choice to encounter a reasonable risk
is neither consensual nor voluntary in the normal sense of these terms.
Instead, the terms are used in the Pickwickian sense that one "voluntarily"
gives money to a thief who says, "Your money or your life."
Such a perverse use of concepts like "consensual" could apply to all
reasonable choices. Life involves constant choices among risks of action (and
inaction). As a result, without a limiting principle, the implied assumption of
risk doctrine could apply to all our reasonable choices. For example, driving
an automobile to work with the knowledge of the nature and extent of
negligent driving by others is usually a reasonable choice among risks because
the costs of not driving can be very high.

219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

496A cmt. c, d (AM. LAW INST. 1965); id.

§ 496C cmt. g.
220. Id. § 496A cmt. b.
221. E.g., HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 213.
222. The doctrine of express assumption of risk is not included in comparative fault.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 213.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 cmt. c, d (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).

224. E.g., Tunk1 v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963); Hanks v.
Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 496B cmt.

e-g (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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To avoid applying the doctrine of implied assumption of risk to everyday
reasonable choices, the doctrine includes the following limitation:
The plaintiff s acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of
conduct in order to:
(a) Avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) Exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the
defendant has no right to deprive him.225
Unfortunately, because of the lack of a clear guide as to rights and
privileges, this limit appears to be applied in an ad hoc manner to choices
among risky alternatives. For example, why is taking a faster, more direct (but
riskier) route to drive to work generally viewed as a right, 226 but a similar
choice concerning walking from one's car to one's home is not? 227

Finally, denying recovery to a plaintiff who chooses to take a reasonable
risk is unfair when compared to a defendant who takes a reasonable risk that
results in a harm to a plaintiff. Unless a strict liability doctrine applies, the
plaintiff would have no claim because a defendant who acts reasonably is not
negligent.
Because of these problems, at least one state has held that "reasonable
'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mistakes that it is better banished from
the scene," 228 and that, it is better to "stay with 'negligence' and 'contributory
negligence. '229 In addition, the Apportionment of Liability Restatement
appears to exclude reasonable assumption of risk as a defense. 230

225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g., Wallace
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 525, 389 S.E.2d 155, 159 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
having to choose between two choices that "involved a risk of harm no matter which choice"
was made was not voluntary).
226. See, e.g., Crouch v. Charleston & Savannah Ry. Co., 21 S.C. 495 (1884) (implicitly
recognizing right to use river despite knowledge of risk that bridge overview was defective);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
227. See, e.g., Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horiz. Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 508
S.E.2d 565 (1998) (choosing to take shorter, but riskier, route treated as unreasonable
assumption of risk even though the choice imposed by defendant's negligence continued daily
for months).
228. McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240-41 (N.J. 1963).
229. Id. at 241.
230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
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Common Law System
a.

Plaintiff-Defendant

The common law tort rule for using fault to allocate responsibility for
injuries can be roughly described as follows:
Defendants are liable for all the legal damage caused by their
negligence unless one of the defenses of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk applies. 231 If either defense applies, plaintiff has
no recovery even if the role of any plaintiff's negligence of risk was
minor compared to the defendant's negligence. 32
There were no exceptions to this rule for assumption of risk. However,
there were two fault-based exceptions to this rule where contributory
negligence was involved.
First, a contributorily negligent plaintiff could recover if the defendant
acted recklessly or intentionally in causing the injury. 233 However, this
exception did not apply in the case of a reckless defendant unless the plaintiff
was contributorily reckless.234
Second, the negligent plaintiff could recover if the defendant had the "last
clear chance" to prevent the injury. 235 in order to prevail under this doctrine,
the plaintiff was required to show: "(1) the defendant knew (or in some cases,
should have known) that, because of the plaintiff's negligence, plaintiff was
in a predicament from which he might not extricate himself; and (2) the
defendant had an opportunity to avoid the injury in spite of the conduct of the
plaintiff."

23 6

&

231. E.g., HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 201. There are other defenses. E.g., id. at
220-44. However, these are not subject to comparative fault approaches.
232. Id. at 204, 212.
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 481-482 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); HUBBARD
& FELIX, supra note 38, at 207-08.
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 482 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); HUBBARD
FELIX, supra note 38, at 207-08.
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479-480 (Am. LAW INST. 1965).
236. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 209.
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Defendant:Defendant

"Joint tortfeasor" is a term of art which applies not only to persons who
are literally acting jointly or in concert but also to persons whose independent
actions have "joined" to cause an indivisible injury to the plaintiff. 237 (If it is
possible to identify separate damages caused by each tortfeasor, they would
only be liable for the damages they caused.) 238 One important aspect of the
common law doctrine of joint and several liability was that the plaintiff could
elect to sue one, some, or all the joint tortfeasors. 23 9 Moreover, the plaintiff
could sue them jointly in one suit or individually in separate suits. 240
At common law, a defendant who was sued separately could notjoin other
joint tortfeasors in the action; this right of joinder was the plaintiffs
exclusively. 24' Each joint tortfeasor was individually liable for the full amount
of the plaintiffs loss.

242

The plaintiffs award from one defendant was not

reduced because other defendants were also "jointly" liable. 243 A defendant
who paid damages for all or part of a plaintiffs injuries did not have a right
of "contribution." As a result, the paying defendant could not force other joint
tortfeasors to pay him anything for the damages paid.244
3.

Third Restatement: Apportionment ofLiability

The Apportionment of Liability Restatement addresses the use of
comparative fault in terms of allocating proportionate shares of fault to
plaintiffs and among defendants. This Restatement "applies to all claims
(including lawsuits and settlements) for death, personal injury (including
emotional distress or consortium), or physical damage to tangible property,
regardless of the liability." 245 Though this Restatement recognizes that

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 709.
Id. at 161-63.
Id
Id
Id at710.
Id

243. Id. Plaintiffs were not overcompensated because they were limited to a single full
recovery for injuries, and defendants were entitled to a set-off if another defendant had made
partial payment. Id. at 710-11.
244. Id at 714. At common law, a joint tortfeasor might have a right of indemnity from
another person. DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1079. Indemnity is not addressed herein.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
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jurisdictions disagree concerning strict liability and intentional torts, 246 it
includes such claims because of a view that the "adoption of comparative
responsibility somewhat undermines the rationale" for different treatment. 247
a.

Plaintiff.-Defendant

Comparative fault systems use four approaches to the treatment of a
plaintiffs fault. 248 First, under an equal-to-or-less-than "modified" system,
the plaintiff can recover a reduced amount of damages if the plaintiffs
percentage of fault is equal to or less than the defendant's. Second, in the lessthan modified system, the plaintiff recovers some damages if the plaintiff's
percentage of fault is less than the defendant's. Third, pure systems allow the
plaintiff to recover, less the plaintiffs share of fault, regardless of the
percentage of the plaintiffs fault. Finally, the slight-gross system allows the
plaintiff to recover damages, less the plaintiffs share of fault, only if the
plaintiffs fault is slight and the defendant's fault is gross. Under all four
systems, plaintiff's recovery, if any, is reduced by plaintiff's percentage share
of fault. Within each of these four types, there is further variation as to the
type of claims covered and the treatment of the common law exceptions to the
total bar to recovery of the common law.249
As with the Products Liability Restatement, the Apportionment of
Liability Restatement reflects a strong normative position. More specifically,
it adopts a pure system of allocating liability between plaintiffs and defendants
even though it recognizes that the two modified systems are widely adopted
by legislatures and that modified systems "can be supported by several
rationales . . . [and are] not without principled support." 25 0
Where legislation does not require a modified system, the pure system is
recommended by the Apportionment of Liability Restatement for the
following reasons:

&

246. Id. § 1, Reporters' Note, at 12-17.
247. Id § 1 cmt. b.
248. Id § 1, Reporters' Note, at 74-75; DOBBS, supra note 148, at 505-06; Hubbard
Felix, supra note 202, at 277-78, 329-30. For an example of the slight-gross scheme, see the
South Dakota scheme at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-2 (2016).
249. Hubbard & Felix, supra note 202, at 332-43.
250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 6, Reporters' Note,
at 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). The reasons in support of the modified systems are said to be:
promotion of settlements, use of comparison only in clear cases of increased fairness, and, in
jurisdictions that already use such a system, high administrative costs of change. Id. Seven of
ten judicially adopted schemes use the pure system; six of twenty-nine legislative schemes use
pure comparative allocation. Id. at 75.
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Pure comparative responsibility reflects the overwhelming
majority of common-law decisions, and it better reflects the
underlying goal of comparative responsibility: apportioning losses
among various parties according to their respective shares of
responsibility. Modified comparative responsibility retains some of
the unfairness imposed by contributory negligence as an absolute
bar.2 5 1
Express contractual assumption of risk is excluded from comparative
fault allocation.252 This approach is taken to enable "parties to agree which of
them should bear the risk of injury . . . ."253 These contracts are subject to
strict construction and unenforceable where public policy bars such
contracts. 254

Section 8 adopts two factors for assigning percentages of responsibility:
(a) the nature of the person's risk-creating conduct, including any
awareness or indifference with respect to the risks created by the
conduct and any intent with respect to the harm created by the
conduct; and
(b) the strength of the causal connection between the person's riskcreating conduct and the harm.255
b.

Defendant:Defendant

In the years preceding the adoption of the Apportionment of Liability
Restatement, the common law system for allocating liability among joint
tortfeasors256 was changed by two types of statutory schemes. First, either by
statute or judicial decision, the states granted the right to a tortfeasor who had
paid a judgment or settlement to a plaintiff to seek contribution from other
joint tortfeasors. 257 Second, comparative fault schemes were established that

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 2 cmt. b.
Id. § 2 cmt. d, e, h.
Id. § 8.

256. See supra notes 237-244 and accompanying text for discussion of the common law
scheme.
257. DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1078-79.
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used comparative fault to allocate liability between the plaintiff and
defendants and among defendants. 25 8
Because of the wide variation in these schemes, 25 9 the Apportionment of
Liability Restatement defers to the law of each jurisdiction 260 and addresses
the liability of multiple tortfeasors in terms of multiple tracks. 26' To the extent
that contribution is involved, a comparative system is adopted. 262 Where each
defendant caused a different injury to the plaintiff, each distinctly caused
injury is allocated to each defendant separately. 263
4.

South Carolina
a.

PlaintiffDefendant

South Carolina adopted comparative fault in a somewhat roundabout
fashion. In 1984, the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted "comparative
negligence" in Langley v. Boyter.264 On appeal, the supreme court quashed
the opinion because the supreme court had previously denied plaintiffs
petition to argue against precedent. 265 Six years later, the supreme court
adopted the following comparative negligence scheme in Nelson v. Concrete
Supply Co.

266

:

For all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff in
a negligence action may recover damages if his or her negligence is
not greater than that of the defendant. The amount of the plaintiffs
recovery shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her
negligence. If there is more than one defendant, the plaintiffs

258. Id. at 1079-91.
259. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17, Reporters' Note,
at 149-59 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (using series of tables to illustrate range of alternatives).

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. §§ 10, 17.
Id. §§ A18-E19.
Id. § 23.
Id. § 26.
284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984).
Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985). The court of appeals was

aware of this denial but rejected "the suggestion that this denial constituted a decision by the
[South Carolina Supreme] Court on the merits of this case." Langley, 284 S.C. at 182,325 S.E.2d

at 562.
266. 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
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negligence shall be compared to the combined negligence of all
defendants. 267

The adoption of this scheme in Nelson was unusual in two ways. First, it
was done in the form of dictum because the court found "as a matter of law
[there was] no negligence on the part of' the defendant. 268 Second, the court's
decision was extremely brief. Rather than provide reasons, the opinion simply
states: "For an exhaustive analytical discussion of the history and merits of
comparative negligence, we refer the bench and bar to the opinion of Chief
Judge Sanders in Langley v. Boyter . . . ."269
The reasons given by the court of appeals in Langley parallel those given
in other states. More specifically, in addition to noting the widespread support
for, and adoption of, comparative negligence, the opinion relies on the
desirability of using comparisons of fault rather than allowing a defendant to
escape all liability where a plaintiffs conduct was no greater than the
defendant's, the confusion that often resulted from the application of the
exceptions, and the permissibility of judicial adoption.270
The reason for the choice of the no-greater-than comparative scheme in
Langley was as follows:
Unlike the pure version, it does not allow a plaintiff to recover when
he has been the most at fault in causing an accident. But, unlike the
not-as-great-as version, it does not allow a defendant to escape all
responsibility for an accident which he was equally at fault in
causing. Instead, the not-greater-than version of the doctrine strikes
the reasonable balance of providing that parties equally at fault in
causing an accident share equally in its cost. 27 1

The court was "also influenced by the conservative approach taken by our
Supreme Court in abrogating doctrines of common law." 272
Numerous issues concerning comparative fault were not addressed in
Langley. Thus, in the years after the decision, it was necessary for other
decisions to address many of these issues. Donze is an example of this process.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784 (citations omitted).
Id. at 245 n.1, 399 S.E.2d at 784 n.1.
Id. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
Langley, 284 S.C. at 169-79, 182-86, 325 S.E.2d at 554-60, 562-64.
Id. at 189, 325 S.E.2d at 565.
Id.
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Other decisions addressed the role of the following doctrines in comparative
fault.
273
(1) Implied assumption of risk is included in comparative fault.

(2) Express assumption of risk is not included.274
(3) Recklessness, gross negligence, and willful or wanton conduct are
included.

275

(4) Intentional torts are not included. 276
(5) Last clear chance is included.277
(6) Punitive damages awards are not included.278
As more items became included in the comparative scheme, it became
clear that the term "comparative negligence" was no longer accurate. In 2001,
the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that South Carolina's approach "is
essentially a comparative fault system" and that comparative fault and
comparative negligence are equivalent.279
b.

Defendant:Defendant

In 1988, the South Carolina legislature changed the common law rule
barring a joint tortfeasor who had paid an award of damages as a settlement
from seeking contribution from another joint tortfeasor. 28 0 The statute
provides a right of "pro rata" contribution 281' among persons "jointly or
severally liable in tort" 28 2 except for cases involving an intentional tort283 or

"breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligation." 28 4 The right of contribution
must be asserted against the other joint tortfeasors in a separate action, unless
the plaintiff has included the defendants involved in the suit by the plaintiff,

273. Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horiz. Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 86-87, 508
S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (1998). The decision addressed secondary implied assumption of risk. See
supra note 218 and accompanying text.
274. Davenport, 333 S.C. at 79-80, 508 S.E.2d at 569-70.
275. Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 293, 709 S.E.2d 607, 615 (2011).
276. Id at 293 n.3, 709 S.E.2d at 615 n.3.
277. Spahn v. Town of Port Royal, 330 S.C. 168, 173, 499 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1998).
278. Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 377-81, 529 S.E.2d 528, 532-35 (2000).
279. Berberich, 392 S.C. at 292, 709 S.E.2d at 614.
280. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-10 to -70. The Act became effective when approved by the
Governor on April 5, 1988. The Act "applies to those causes of action arising or accruing on or
after the effective date. . . ." Act No. 432 § 10 (1988). See supra note 244 and accompanying
text for discussion of the common law rule barring contribution.
281. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-10 (2005).
282. Id. § 15-38-20(A).
283. Id. § 15-38-20(C).
284. Id. § 15-38-20(G).
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in which case, the contribution issues are addressed after the plaintiffs suit
for liability has been resolved. 285

In 2005, as a part of a comprehensive "tort reform" package, the
legislature adopted a comparative fault scheme forjoint tortfeasors. Under this
scheme, traditional common law joint and several liability applies to the
following types of defendant: (1) any defendant whose fault was fifty percent
or more of the combined fault of all defendants and the plaintiff; and (2) any
defendant whose conduct was "willful, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent, or
intentional or conduct involving the use, sale, or possession of alcohol or
drugs." 28 6 As to all other defendants, joint and several liability is abolished
and each of these defendants is liable only for that defendant's percentage of
fault. 287
The statute provides that percentages of fault are to be determined in a
two-step process. First, the fact finder will determine plaintiffs recoverable
damages using the comparative fault scheme described in Section II.C.4
above. 288 Second, where the preceding determination indicates that two or
more defendants are liable for plaintiff s damages, and at least one defendant
has moved for an allocation between or among defendants, the court will
determine the percentage share of each defendant as follows: (a) allow oral
argument by the parties (but not new evidence) on the issue; and (b) specify
in a special verdict the percentage of fault of each defendant whose conduct
proximately caused the plaintiff s injuries.289 Where a settlement is involved,
"setoff from any settlement received from any potential tortfeasor prior to the
verdict shall be applied in proportion to each defendant's percentage of
liability. . . ."29 0
D.

Tort Reform

Another important development of the latter part of the twentieth century
was the emergence of the "tort reform" movement. This movement consisted
of a diverse group of repeat players on the defense side of tort litigation who
worked to "reform" tort doctrine in their favor. Initially, these efforts
consisted of ad hoc efforts to address a series of "crises," primarily in terms
of the cost and availability of liability insurance, including products liability

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 38, at 716.

Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712-13.
Id.
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insurance. 291In the 1980s, the tort reform movement began to develop a more
permanent institutionalized approach to the push for "reform," primarily
through legislation at the state level.292
Traditionally, reform of tort law proceeded slowly as courts addressed
arguments based on policy and changing times. 293 Legislative reforms were
relatively rare and often consisted of adopting alternatives to tort, like
workers' compensation, rather than specific changes in tort doctrine. 294
The tort reform movement has changed the nature and techniques of
reform in many ways. For example, it has relied on the use of legislation,
politics, and massive publicity campaigns that use rhetorical references to
crises, "lawsuit abuse," and "judicial hellholes." 295 These techniques had
considerable success in shaping both products liability and comparative fault.
The goals, techniques, and success of this movement were part of a broader
effort begun in the 1970s by large corporations to reduce both regulatory and
judicial limits on corporate actions. 296
Several examples illustrate the success of the tort reform movement in
changing rules concerning products liability. Some states have adopted a
rebuttable presumption that a product that complied with government
regulations was not defective and that punitive damages should not be
imposed.297 Statutes of repose were adopted to bar suit for product defect after
a set time from the sale of the product. 298 Because product manufacturers tend
to be the "deep pocket" in a products liability claim, there was a concern not
only to eliminate joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors but also to
eliminate it in particular ways. 299 The movement's push to reduce both

OWEN, supra note 117, § 1.3, at 23-24.
F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement, 35
L. REV. 437, 469-79, 483-538 (2006); Roederer, supra note 115.
Hubbard, supra note 292, at 463-67.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 472-74.
See, e.g., JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND POWER 95-138 (2004) (discussing reduction of limitations involving the environment and
worker safety); F. Patrick Hubbard, "Takings Reform" and the Process of Legislative Change
in a "National Movement, " 50 S.C. L. REV. 93, 109-14 (1998) (discussing for increased
protection of property rights in response to regulations affecting land use). In terms of torts, this
effort included a push to select judges with an increased concern for business vis-d-vis reducing
the harms caused by business. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 292, at 532-34; Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End ofthe Rise ofModern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV.
601, 685-87 (1992).
297. See Hubbard, supra note 292, at 514.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 513. See infra notes 307-314 and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
291.
292.
HOFSTRA
293.
294.
295.
296.
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compensatory and punitive damages awards was designed in part to help
products sellers.300 In 2011, the Florida legislature adopted a statute explicitly
mandating comparative fault in crashworthiness cases. 30' The Act containing
this statute explicitly indicates its intent to "overrule" D'Amario v. Ford
Motor Co.,302 which held that comparative fault would not apply in
crashworthiness cases.303 The movement was also involved in shaping the
ProductsLiability Restatement.304 The tort reform movement was involved in
South Carolina legislation, including the replacement of joint and several
liability with a comparative allocation scheme in 2005305 and limitations on
the imposition of punitive damages in 2011.306
The push for changes in joint and several liability provides an example of
the negative impact of tort reform on recovery for plaintiffs. "Until the tort
reform movement appeared, joint and several liability was not
controversial." 307 Where no statute controls, "the majority of courts ... have
held that comparative fault does not require modification of joint and several
liability." 308 Within the legislative arena, however, the techniques of the tort
reform movement resulted in the widespread abolition of joint and several
liability. The importance of the way these changes are made can be seen by
comparing the common law scheme with the comparative scheme.
Under the common law doctrine, a plaintiff injured in an automobile
accident who was not at fault could recover from a negligent driver for
damages caused by the initial collision and for the second collision. The
plaintiff could also recover damages for the second collision from the seller
of a vehicle which had a defect in terms of crashworthiness that resulted in

300. DOBBS, supra note 148, § 391; Hubbard, infra note 422, at 485-88 (collateral source
rule), 492-509 (damages).
301. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(d) (West 2017).
302. 2011 Fla. Laws, ch. 2011-215 § 2.
303. D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001); see 2011 Fla. Laws, ch.
2011-215 § 2.
304. See, e.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (Md. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that Section 2 "has been criticized as representing an unwanted ascendancy of
corporate interests under the guise of tort reform"); supra notes 183-184 (discussing successful
effort by defense bar membership to change a draft of comment f to Section 16 to the adopted
version, which is more favorable to sellers).
305. See supra notes 286-290 and accompanying text.
306. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 38, at 641, 644-45, 650-52, 750 (discussing
"Fairness in Justice Act").
307. DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1085. Dobbs notes that the arguments for eliminating joint
and several liability are "overrated." Id. at 1086.
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21, Reporters'
Note, at 214 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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enhanced injuries. The recovery from the seller for injuries in the second
collision would not be reduced by any negligence by the negligent driver. This
recovery could be crucial because, as a case like Donze v. General Motors
illustrates, the enhanced injuries can be much greater than the injury that
would have occurred without the product defect.
The change from joint and several liability to comparative fault can have
a tremendous impact on a plaintiffs recovery in a case like this. Assuming,
for example, that damages of $1,000,000 result from the second collision, a
fault-free plaintiff under the common law system could sue the manufacturer
for the full $1,000,000. In contrast, if a comparative fault scheme is used to
allocate the liability, and the jury found the driver was 60% at fault and the
manufacturer was 40% at fault, each would be liable for only the respective
percentage shares of $600,000 for the driver and $400,000 for the seller. It is
likely that the driver may have had, at most, $50,000 in liability insurance to
handle the liability. As a result, the plaintiff would only get a total of
$450,000. (With the common law system of joint and several liability and a
contribution scheme, plaintiff would receive $1,000,000 from the seller, who
would get $50,000 from the driver.)30 9
This effect results because the problem of uncollectibility of judgments
presents "the critical question . . . [of] who should bear the risk of insolvent

parties." 310 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provided for proportional
reallocation of uncollectible amounts.3 1' However, only one of the five
existing schemes addressed in the Apportionment of Liability Restatement
provides for reallocation based on comparative fault of the uncollectible
portion of $450,000.312 The South Carolina approach, which has no provision
for uncollectibility ofjudgments,31 3 is an example of most of the schemes that
have been adopted.3 14 Where proportional reallocation of an uncollectible
judgment is used, because the plaintiff in the example was not at fault, a
proportional reallocation scheme would result in the seller being liable for the
entire uncollectible amount of $450,000.

309. See DOBBS, supra note 148, at 203-08 and text accompanying note 252 for a
discussion of contribution.
310. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21, Reporters'
Note, at 214 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
311. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 43 (1977).
312. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
313. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2005).
314. See DOBBS, supra note 148, at 1085.
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This approach to the uncollectable amount has two beneficial effects.
First, the imposition of the additional $550,000 forces the manufacturer to
apply the cost-benefit test to design in terms of a liability cost ($950,000) that
is closer to the full accident costs of $1,000,000 rather than the lower liability
figure of $400,000.315 Second, it provides a better approach for addressing the
impact of the accident on the plaintiff.3 16
E. Importance of Context
The historical context of developments in products liability is important
for a number of reasons. For example, the decision in the influential California
case of Daly v. General Motors Corp.,3 17 which held that comparative fault
applied to strict liability, was shaped in part by the desire to avoid a possible
total bar to recovery for the plaintiff.3 18 If comparative fault had already been
applied to strict liability, this concern would not have existed.
The tort reform movement also has had an impact on tort law. In terms of
products liability, this impact is reflected in a wide range of areas, including
statutory change31 9 and the adoption of the ProductsLiability Restatement.3 20
IV. POLICY

Tort is a judicially administered system of corrective justice for allocating
injury costs resulting from a "wrong," defined as a breach of duty in tort, to a
victim. 3 2' Because this definition encompasses a broad range of "duties" (and

thus of "wrongs"), there is no single test or definition of duty or of wrong in
tort law generally or in some of the specifics of products liability. The
determination of the duty imposed on a person is "a purely legal question"3 22
for courts and legislatures; factual issues concerning whether a legal duty
existed in a particular case is a matter for the jury.3 23 Section 7 of the Third
Restatement states the basic framework for the duty of due care as follows:

315. See infra notes 325-337, 416-420 and accompanying text.
316. See infra notes 337-345 and accompanying text.
317. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
318. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 297-314 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 292, at 445-52 (discussing three goals of tort law:
deterrence/efficiency, corrective justice/fairness, and compensation, and arguing that
compensation is a means of achieving the other two goals, not a goal in itself).
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. j, at 82 (AM. LAW INST. 2010 & 2012).
323. Id. § 7 cmt. a (emphasis added).
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(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when
the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm.
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle
or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of
cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the
ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.
A judicial ruling "that no liability should be imposed on actors in a category
of cases ... should be explained and justified based on articulated policies or
principles that justify exempting these actors from liability or modifying the
ordinary duty of reasonable care." 324
Though "[o]rdinary language makes it awkward to speak of a person
having a duty of care to himself or herself... cases arise in which courts hold
that a plaintiffs recovery should not be affected by [comparative
responsibility rules regarding] the plaintiffs own negligent conduct."325 The
approach adopted in Donze is an example of a case where a court makes such

a legal determination that comparative fault will not affect a plaintiffs
recovery. The following part of this Article argues that two basic policy
concerns of tort law efficiency and fairness-support the Donze approach
and satisfy the Restatement's concern that this approach "should be explained
and justified on articulated policies or principles."
A.

Efficiency

Accident law, including products liability, can be viewed in terms of three
efficiency goals. One goal is the reduction of the number and severity of
accidents in a cost-effective manner. 326 Second, after accidents have occurred,
the costs of these accidents should be allocated efficiently.3 27 Finally, the
administrative costs of addressing the first two goals should be addressed in a

324. Id. 7 cmt. j, at 82.
325. Id § 7 cmt. h.
326. GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970) ("[It is] axiomatic that the

principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
avoiding accidents."). Because of space limitations, the discussion of goals in this Article does
not examine many of the important complexities of efficient accident cost reduction. Calabresi's
book contains an excellent review of these details.
327. Id. at 27-28.
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fair, efficient manner.3 28 Because these efficiency goals can conflict with one
another and with other types of goals, balancing and choices are necessary.3 29
Tort law is only one part of the overall system used to address these
diverse goals. Therefore, administratively efficient reduction of accident costs
requires coordination within the total system of accident law. Such
coordination is beyond the scope of this Article.3 30
Tort law addresses the reduction of the number and severity of injuries
with a market approach. Where products are concerned, the use of the market
approach is complicated by the need to address an underlying issue that is
often overlooked: when are product-caused injuries a cost of selling (sellers
incur the costs) or a cost of living (victims incur the cost)?3 3' In part, debates
about strict liability and comparative fault are about the answer to this
question.
One answer to this question is to use the cost-benefit test for design and
warnings/instructions adopted by the Products Liability Restatement. The
effect of this test is that sellers incur accident costs when the costs of a safety
measure are less than the injuries prevented. Where the safety measure's cost
exceeds the accident costs, victims incur the costs.
In terms of the corrective justice approach of tort law, requiring costeffective expenditures on safety plays a central role in defining the duties to
potential victims owed by product sellers. Given this role, corrective justice
and the efficient reduction of product-caused injury costs are not necessarily
in conflict with each other. Instead, where efficiency defines duties, the
corrective justice system of products liability tends to promote efficiency in
reducing the number and severity of accidents.
The role for efficiency in defining duty can be illustrated in simplified
terms of economic analysis by considering two possible situations. First,
accident costs could be avoided with a cost-effective design. In this case,
liability for lack of that design incentivizes the manufacturer to use that
efficient safety design. In other words, this liability deters manufacturers from
giving inadequate weight to accident prevention.33 2 Second, it is efficient not

328. Id. at 28.
329. Id. at 28-33.
330. For a discussion of the broader systems, see, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, "Sophisticated
Robots": Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1803, 1811-50
(2014) (discussing judicially applied corrective justice schemes and regulatory schemes for
addressing injury costs caused by products); Hubbard, supra note 292, at 439-456 (discussing
distribution of costs).
331. CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 133-73.
332. See, e.g., Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 115 (1996) (referring to "New
Jersey's policy in deterring tortious conduct of manufacturers" in deciding that New Jersey law
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to incur safety costs if these costs exceed the accident costs that would be
prevented. Therefore, victims bear the costs of injuries in such cases. The
result is that the manufacturer has a privilege to impose efficient accident costs
on victims.333 Moreover, under both traditional and comparative fault
schemes, victims may bear part (or all) of the loss where victim fault is also a
cause even though the manufacturer did not use an efficient safety design.33 4
This simplified model has two shortcomings that are relevant in a case like
Donze v. General Motors.
First, partial or total denial of recovery for a victim whose fault was a
cause of the injury is based on the assumption that humans are rational. Such
an assumption simplifies analysis but ignores human psychology. The
concern to incorporate a realistic view of humans has given rise to a new
approach of "behavioral economics," which has had such an important impact
that its "founder" recently received the Nobel Prize.335 This field is too vast
to address herein. Therefore, for the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to
note that actual behavior is sufficiently important that we need to address it in
considering the efficient allocation of accident costs. In particular, humans are
not very good at assessing risk and are, therefore, likely to make inefficient
(negligent) choices.336 Given their weakness in making and implementing risk

was controlling), abrogated on other grounds by McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 153
A.3d 207 (2017); Kimco Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603, 607 (Pa.
1993) ("The deterrent effect of imposing strict product liability standards would be weakened
were we to allow actions based upon it to be defeated, or recoveries reduced by negligence
concepts."); supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing concern for deterrence in
Donze v. GeneralMotors).
333. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 5-10 (1919) (dismissing privilege as the opposite of duty and
the correlative of "no-right").
334. See supra notes 248-249, 266-272 and accompanying text.
335. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Nobel in Economics is Awarded to Richard Thaler, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2017, at BI. For a discussion and critique of behavioral economics, see, for
example, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, BehavioralEconomics, and the Law, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1551 (1998).
336. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 55-64, 96-107 (questioning whether
humans deal with risk "rationally"); Harlon L. Dalton, Shaping Responsible Behavior: Lessons
from the AIDS Front, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 931 (1999) (criticizing legal system's view of
humans as "psychological stick figures" that does not reflect reality); Andrew F. Popper, In
Defense ofDeterrence, 75 ALA. L. REv. 181, 181-200 (2012) (noting that institutions respond
to incentives from liability more reliably than humans); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 386-87,
405-13, 422-23 (1994) (reviewing arguments and studies and concluding that tort law deters
enough injuries to be worth its administrative cost, particularly in areas like products liability
with institutional systems rather than risk assessment by ordinary humans); Daniel W. Shuman,
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assessments, imposing liability on humans often has very little effect on
incentivizing them to be rational and efficient.33 7
In assessing efficient accident cost reduction, it is important to consider
an important difference between humans and corporations. Corporate
manufacturers must act through humans, but automobile manufacturers are
able to set up administrative systems to focus on rational assessment of risk
and to incentivize human employees to use these systems. As a result,
corporations faced with negligence or strict liability regimes are much better
at evaluating options. Therefore, the liability incentive has more effect on their
actions than it does on individual humans. 338
The second problem with the efficient accident prevention model is that
the manufacturer's privilege to impose efficient accident costs on victims can
conflict with the concern for addressing the post-accident costs. After an
accident, spread losses (for example, through insurance) have a much lesser
effect on victims (and on persons with relationships with victims) than lump
sum losses. 339 in other words, the distributional impact of the privilege to
impose accident costs on victims if it is inefficient to avoid those costs
matters: (1) in terms of efficiency because of the reduced overall costs
resulting from spreading, and (2) in terms of a fair distribution. 340 Such
spreading can be achieved if the manufacturer includes an "insurance
premium" in the price of each car to cover the costs of nonnegligent injuries
in a strict liability scheme. 34 1

The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 115, 115-17, 127-29, 160-64
(1993) (discussing flaws in humans' assessment of risk).
337. E.g., CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 55-57, 206-08, 245-46; Popper, supra note 336,
at 181-200; Schwartz, supra note 336, at 386-87, 405-13, 422-23; Shuman, supra note 336, at
127-29.
338. See CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 245-46 (discussing workers' compensation and
accident costs); Popper, supra note 336, at 181-200; Schwartz, supra note 336, at 386-87, 40513, 422-23; Shuman, supra note 336, at 127-29 (distinguishing "impulsive" behavior of humans
with "deliberate" behavior of corporate entities like automobile manufacturers).
339. See CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 27-28, 39-67, 278-79, 283-84.
340. For a critique of the fairness of the distributional impacts of tort law, see, for example,
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972)
(contrasting two paradigms for addressing tort liability: reciprocity (based on fairness) and
reasonableness (based on maximizing social utility)).
341. See, e.g., Kimco Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa.
1993) (quoting Azarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Pa. 1978)) ("The realities of
our economic society as it exists today forces the conclusion that the risk of loss for injury
resulting from defective products should be borne by the suppliers, principally because they are
in a position to absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing business."); supra note 155
and accompanying text.
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Generally, using common law tort rather than legislation to spread losses
for accidents in this way is subject to two basic objections.3 42 First, using a
judicially administered liability system like tort involves far higher
administrative costs than using first party insurance like health insurance or
life insurance.3 43 Second, serious questions of competency and legitimacy are
raised if courts, rather than legislatures, compel a defendant to compensate a
victim's lump sum loss simply because the defendant is in a better position to
spread the loss. 3 44

Despite these objections, spreading can play a legitimate role as a "tiebreaker" where the manufacturer and victim are both at fault or are both
innocent of any wrongdoing. For example, partly because manufacturers are
usually better at spreading costs than individuals, the Products Liability
Restatement uses spreading to justify strict liability for manufacturing
defects.3 45 For similar reasons, all sellers in the chain of distribution, including
those who had no role in design or manufacturing, are strictly liable for injury
from product defects and from misrepresentation. 346 The California approach
of using time of trial rather than state of the art also illustrates the use of
spreading as a tie-breaker. 347

342. A third objection is sometimes raised. The following selection from Coney v. J.L.G.
Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983), indicates this objection to spreading a basis for imposing
liability where a victim is partly at fault:
Further, the risk associated with the product defect is still spread among all
consumers. Only that portion due to plaintiffs own conduct or fault is borne by the
plaintiff. Where the allocation of losses properly can be apportioned, we see no reason
to spread the cost of the loss resulting from plaintiff s own fault on to the consuming
public.
This type of argument assumes that the "consuming public" is composed of "reasonable
persons" who are never negligent. This assumption is not valid because no human satisfies this
standard consistently. See supra notes 335-336 and accompanying text. Consequently, being "at
fault" is, to a considerable extent, a matter of luck rather than being evidence of a character trait.
See infra notes 374-380 and accompanying text.
As a result of the somewhat random nature of victims' fault, all of the "public" is "insured"
under a loss spreading liability scheme. Ignoring this public coverage of loss spreading is like
complaining that, because only sick persons get payments from hospital insurance, well persons
are unfairly subsidizing the payments.
343. Hubbard, supra note 292, at 449-50.
344. Id. at 450-52.
345. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 164-165, 166-167 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
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B. Fairness
Arguments based on fairness often overlook the following issue: who is
entitled to fairness in terms of law or morals? One reason for ignoring this
question is that we simply assume that fairness applies only to humans, who
obviously have a right to fair treatment by other humans. However, because
automobile manufacturers are corporate enterprises, another question arises:
corporations are legal persons, but are they entitled to fairness in the same
way as humans? This Section of the Article addresses this question and argues
that corporations are not entitled to fairness in the same way as humans.
1.

Humans

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops his concept of justice as
fairness.3 48 Rawls views an autonomous person in terms of "a human life lived
according to a plan."3 49 The "notion of a plan" is used to "characterize the
coherent, systematic purposes of the individual, what makes him a conscious,
unified moral person." 350 Rawls uses this notion to define "a person's good as
the successful execution of a rational plan of life." 35 ' Though there are various
ways to view the relationship between expectations and a life plan,35 2 a
person's life plan is affected by the extent to which expectations are satisfied.
Consequently, faimess-based views of morality and justice should be
concerned with the extent to which the legal system protects reasonable
expectations underlying humans' life plans.

348. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 311-18 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed.
1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY] (referring to "justice as fairness").
349. Id. at 358; see id at 450-56 (discussing autonomy); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 18-22 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]. Rawls's concept of a life plan
was adapted from the views of Josiah Royce set forth in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY (1908).
Id. The concept was also used by John Stuart Mill, who referred to the importance of a person
choosing "his plan of life." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprintedin THE ENGLISH
PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 949, 994 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939). For a general
discussion of life plans within the context of liberal theory, see GERALD GAUS, THE MODERN
LIBERAL THEORY OF MAN 32-45 (1983). Even critics of liberalism adopt this view. See, e.g.,
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 205 (3d ed. 2007)

(arguing for "a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth
to life to death").
350. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 348, at 358 n. 10.
351. Id. at 380.
352. See, e.g., id. at 80-81 (comparing "satisfactions to be expected when plans are
executed" with knowing "how the distribution of goods to the more favored affects the
expectations of the most disfavored").
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Justice concerns are also involved in the substantive context of
expectations. Consequently, the manner in which a legal system addresses the
goals of accident law should be just. The arguments given in support of "strict
liability" for product-caused injury reflect a scheme of justice that attempts to
balance the concern for efficiency and innovation in manufacturing with a
distributive concern for the protection of the reasonable expectations of
humans. 35 3 In terms of this balanced scheme, the approach of the Products
Liability Restatement to design defects is arguably unjust because it places so
much emphasis on efficiency that human injuries and frustrated expectations
are viewed simply as unfortunate but necessary costs that, in effect, subsidize
cheaper products.
2.

Corporations

Products liability law focuses on the responsibilities of commercial
product sellers, which are almost always for-profit corporate entities. In the
case of automobiles, these corporations also tend to be very large. Products
liability rules are often based on a concern for this corporate nature. 354 In
contrast, comparative fault schemes address "issues of apportioning liability
among two or more persons." 355 Their "underlying goal ... [is] apportioning
losses among various parties according to their respective shares of
responsibility." 356 These comparative schemes focus on parties and show little
or no concern for whether human persons or corporate persons are the parties
involved. 357 This difference from products liability in considering the nature
and role of corporate entities has an important impact in the treatment of the
comparative allocation of liability between corporate defendants and human
plaintiffs.
Corporations have been recognized as nonnatural persons for centuries.
However, because these "corporate persons" lack the physical dimensions
necessary to act and think as a human person, their decisions and actions can
only be undertaken by human agents acting on behalf of the entity. As noted

353. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., supra note 155 and accompanying text.
355. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
356. Id. § 7, Reporters' Note, at 76.
357. See id. § 8 (discussing factors for assigning percentages of responsibility without
regard to nature of persons involved). This Restatement arguably shows some concern for the
cost-spreading ability of corporate liability insurance companies in Section 9, which provides
for offsetting judgments except where a liability insurer is involved.
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centuries ago, a corporation "has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
kicked." 358
Because they lack the characteristics required for human personhood, the
rights granted to corporate persons are extremely limited. For example,
corporations have owners, who can buy, sell, or dissolve (kill) a corporation
with virtually no substantive restraints. Though corporations are persons for
some purposes under the Constitution,35 9 they do not have a right to life or
physical liberty. Nor do they have the right to vote under the provisions of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Corporate personhood is simply a fictional legal status designed to
implement a set of complex legal relationships among human persons.3 60
When the treatment of the corporation as a separate legal entity does not
further this goal, its personhood is often abandoned. Thus, for example,
because the ability to buy, sell, and dissolve corporations is crucial to
implementing the rights and duties of the humans involved, we view the
corporation as a thing, not a person, in terms of this ability.
Fairness arguments about tort law often rely on moral arguments that
emphasize human rights and values like freedom and equality. Such

358. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An UnscandalizedInquiry
into the Problem ofCorporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting the Lord
Chancellor of England, Edward, First Baron Thurlow); see, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "corporations have no consciences,
no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires"); ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN
ARTIFICIAL PERSON: LOST RESPONSIBILITY IN PROFESSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 86 (1992)
(concluding that "it is implausible to treat a corporation as a member of the human community,
a member with a personality (but not a face), intentions (but no feelings), relationships (but no
family or friends), responsibility (but no conscience), and susceptibility to punishment (but no
capacity for pain)").
359. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 385 (holding that corporations' First
Amendment right to free speech was violated by statutory restrictions on use of corporate funds
to support or oppose political candidates within thirty days of elections).
360. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

§

1.2 (1986)

(listing

advantages of corporate form as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its owners
(shareholders) as: limited liability, transferability of assets, efficiency in carrying out legal
actions, and centralized managerial power); J. STORRS HALL, BEYOND Al: CREATING THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE MACHINE 237 (2007) (noting one advantage of a corporate firm is that "[a]

subsection of the market process is frozen into an encapsulated pattern of contractual
relationships, which eliminates the market overhead for commonly repeated transactions");
Larry D. Soderquist, Theory ofthe Firm: What a CorporationIs, 25 J. CORP. L. 375, 381 (2000)
("While the conception of the corporation as an artificial person has great utility ....
it
is . . actually a quick, shorthand reference to a corporation's rights and obligations."); see also
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing several theories of the
corporation and concluding that "[i]t is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the
corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural persons in fimdamental ways .. .").
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arguments raise difficult threshold questions concerning the definition and
nature of morality as well as the relationships among the concepts of morality,
law, and justice.3 6' Addressing such questions is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it is useful to keep in mind that, though concepts (and
conceptions)3 62 like justice and morality are important, they are also
extraordinarily challenging to articulate, organize, and apply. In addition,
multifactor tests of morality that capture the complexity of the world present
the challenge of balancing the factors in a way that is not simply ad hoc.
David Owen, a leading products liability scholar,3 63 has constructed a
multifactor approach for addressing the relationship between morality and
products liability law. His approach is based on a blend of: (1) the views of
rights-oriented philosophers like Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Ronald
Dworkin with (2) the views of utilitarian philosophers like Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill. Owen uses this blend to argue that fault (negligence) is
a necessary requirement for imposing liability for accidental injury, including
liability for design and warning defects.3 64 To Owen, negligence is best
expressed by the efficiency formula in Learned Hand's calculus of risk, which
imposes liability only where the defendant failed to use a cost-effective

361. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2-6, 13-15 (2011)
(distinguishing among justice, law, ethics, morality, and politics); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 155-212 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the relationship between justice and morality and
between law and morality).
362. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-72 (1986) (illustrating distinction
between concept and conception by comparing concept of courtesy with conceptions of the
conduct required by the concept).
363. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Believing in ProductsLiability: Reflections on Daubert,
DoctrinalEvolution, and David Owen's ProductsLiability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 511,
512-16 (2006) (summarizing Owen's scholarship).
364. David G. Owen, PhilosophicalFoundationsofFault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 201, 228 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter Owen, Foundations
ofFault] (discussing values of freedom, equality, and common good and concluding that "fault
defines the core and borders of responsibility throughout this entire area of the law"); David G.
Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 719-24 (1992) [hereinafter Owen, FaultPit].
Owen argues in The Fault Pit, supra at 704, that strict liability for product defects was the
work of "well-meaning but misguided reformers" whose "infatuation . . .with a rule of strict
liability, in opposition to a rule of fault or negligence, is now beginning to take on an air of
quaintness, reflecting the exuberant excesses of youth." However, he later argues for strict
liability in some aspects of products liability. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Products Liability Law, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 463-68, 482-83, 502-03 (1993)
[hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations] (discussing strict liability for innocent
misrepresentation and manufacturing defects, which are viewed as most likely to result from
negligence).

806

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 741

approach to accident prevention and which is applied on the basis of
reasonable foreseeability.3 65
In support of his claim that his use of the calculus of risk approach is a
moral scheme that blends rights and utility,3 66 Owen relies on concepts of each

human's equal right to freedom and autonomy and of the corresponding
responsibilities that he asserts go with freedom and autonomy.3 67 He uses
these responsibilities to support the following claim concerning products
liability: "[M]ost consumers are generally capable of acting reasonably, and
so their failure to conform their conduct to normal, proper standards ordinarily
reflects a moral failure of responsibility." 3 68 Using this claim of humans'
general capability to act reasonably, Owen argues that product users should
"bear responsibility for harm that results from uses that fall below a norm that
fairly may be expected of ordinary persons"3 69 and "should be responsible for

365. Owen, FoundationsofFault, supra note 364; Owen, Moral Foundations,supra note
364, at 455-57; Owen, The Fault Pit, supra note 364, at 721-22. See supra notes 332-334 and
accompanying text for discussion of efficiency and accident costs.
366. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at 438-53 (emphasizing freedom in
discussing concepts of person and of community).
367. See Owen, Foundations of Fault, supra note 364, at 202-04 (discussing freedom),
206-12 (discussing equality), 212-15 (discussing common good), 216-20 (discussing conflicts
among persons), 223-28 (arguing for fault as proper way of achieving moral equality for
accidental harm); Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364 (presenting arguments similar to
those in Foundations of Fault, supra note 364, with focus on products liability and with a
different organizational scheme); Owen, The FaultPit, supra note 364, at 703-16 (arguing that
courts generally reject strict liability for accidental harm), 716-24 (arguing that fault, defined in
terms of Learned Hand's calculus of risk, is the proper scheme for allocating accidental losses
among autonomous persons).
368. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at 505. Owen supports this claim with
the following argument:
To hold otherwise would derogate the dignity of consumers as autonomous beings
who are morally accountable for the harmful consequences of their chosen actions
that they should know to be unsafe. Consumers cannot fairly demand to be relieved
of the harmful consequences of mistakes attributable to their moral failures, nor to
have such harm imposed instead upon other persons free of moral blame. Shifting and
spreading losses in such cases would deny the equal worth of other, blameless
persons, and it would deny as well the moral responsibility of the careless consumer.
But moral responsibility for product accidents often is shared between the user and
the maker, for often product accidents are attributable to moral failings of both parties.
In such cases, legal responsibility generally should be apportioned according to some
fair and practicable standard of comparative fault.
Id.
369. Id.
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foreseeable harm caused by product uses that they should know to be
unreasonably dangerous."37 0
Owen uses this scheme of the moral responsibilities of users to address
the issue presented in Donze as follows:
Although for many years I thought that a plaintiffs conduct in
causing a collision was entirely unrelated to a manufacturer's prior
responsibility to adopt reasonable design precautions against that
eventuality, I now believe that both auto makers and auto drivers
have roughly equivalent responsibilitiesto take reasonable steps to
avoid and minimize injuries in automotive collisions-at bottom,
quite like the duty of care all actors owe to one another when they
interact in the world. Tort law, that is, broadly and fairly requires
people to act with reasonable care to protect the interests of those who
may be expected to be affected by their conduct. 371
Owen's adoption of and use of his fault framework has three basic problems.
First, negligence systems have serious problems in terms of morality
because, to a considerable extent, tort liability is based on luck, which is a
very questionable basis for imposing personal responsibility for accidental
injuries.372 Humans may be, as Owen asserts, "generally capable of acting
reasonably." 373 However, as indicated above, despite this general capability,
humans consistently encounter problems in acting reasonably because they
often act on the basis of flawed risk assessments. 374 As a result, consistent
compliance with the negligence standard of care, whether expressed in terms
of the infallible reasonable person or of the rational application of the calculus
of risk, 375 is not possible for humans. For all of us, no matter how much we
try to use due care, negligent conduct is inevitable.
As a result, it is simply a matter of luck whether: (1) an injury occurs as
a result of our inevitable negligent acts; and (2) the injury that occurs is major

370. Id. at 502.
371. OWEN, supra note 117, at 1088 (emphasis added).
372. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 361, at 2-3. Dworkin asserts: "People are not
responsible for much of what determines their place in . . [a market] economy. They are not
responsible for their genetic endowment and innate talent. They are not responsible for the good
and bad luck they have throughout their lives. There is nothing . .. about personal responsibility,
that would entitle government to adopt . . .a posture" that ignores the impact of luck. Id. at 3.
373. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at 505 (emphasis added).
374. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
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or minor. 376 Thus, whether stated in terms of calculus of risk or the reasonable
person, liability based in negligence results, to a considerable degree, in
liability based on being unlucky in terms of the results of negligent actions.
This liability is imposed despite our inability to meet the standard
consistently.3 77 Though the use of an objective standard in the negligence
system can be defended in terms of providing legal redress for injuries,3 78 this
arbitrary luck dimension raises serious questions concerning the moral basis
for imposing liability for negligence because moral standards for blame or
liability should not depend on luck. 379
Luck also has an impact on accident victims in three ways.38 0 First, with
a negligence system, a manufacturer who designs a vehicle's crash safety
system in an efficient manner faces no liability. This privilege of
manufacturers to injure efficiently means that victims of the efficient design
are unlucky and, as a result, must bear a lump sum cost so that social utility
can be maximized.381 Second, luck determines whether a negligent defendant
can satisfy a judgment for victim's injuries. Third, with comparative fault
schemes, the victim's right to recover is often reduced or denied because
human plaintiffs, like human defendants, are not capable of consistently
satisfying the negligence standard of care.
Second, Owen's attempt to blend rights and utilitarianism is, at best, only
partially successful. In terms of a moral approach to human's responsibility
for accidental harm to one another, the utilitarian calculus of risk approach
based on foreseeability is a useful part of an egalitarian scheme of liability. 382
Arguably, this type of argument could also be applied to the test for design
defect as follows: at the time of design/manufacture, the number and nature
of potential victims are simply statistics that should be used in applying the
calculus of risk; therefore, part of the "moral" solution is to include a role for
utilitarianism, which gives each "statistical person" equal concern and respect.

376. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
377. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and the Mitigation ofMoral
Luck, 2 J. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 1 (2006).
378. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 377, at 1149-63; Keating, supra note 377.
379. Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 791 (1990) (critiquing
theory and practice of tort law and noting that "tort liability is incoherent as a moral system");
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 377.
380. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 377.
381. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 340; John L. Watts, Fairness and Utility in Products
Liability: Balancing Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 597, 600
(2011); cf, e.g., DWORKIN, supranote 361, at 3.
382. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 361, at 290-91.
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As an argument for torts generally and for the substantive cost-benefit test
of design defect, these two limited statements have some merit. The need for
limiting the role of fault and foreseeability in determining liability is
recognized by Owen and reflected by the strict liability aspects of the Products
LiabilityRestatement.383 However, Owen and the Restatement do not limit the
efficiency approach in ways that address the effects of the cost-benefit
approach on the victims of product-caused injuries, particularly in terms of
the challenges of litigation, the lack of spreading of costs, and the impact of
the application of comparative fault to achieve a "fair" allocation of the costs
of injuries from products.384
Regardless of whether the calculus of risk has a determinative role as a
necessary requirement for liability or as part of a larger scheme, the costbenefit approach encounters the difficulty, recognized by Learned Hand, that
the three factors of probability, seriousness of injury, and cost of accident
avoidance "are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and
the second two are generally not so, even theoretically. For this reason a
solution always involves some preference or choice between
incommensurables. . . ."38 5 On the other hand, 38 6 product design decisions are
perhaps an area where quantitative estimates are useful. 38 7

In addition to the difficulties of application, any broader statement of the
role of utilitarian measures in allocating liability effectively eliminates the
fundamental concern for human rights underlying the schemes of Rawls,
Dworkin, and Kant. Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism and made clear that
his goal was to replace utilitarianism with a rights-based social contract
scheme based on Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. 388 Dworkin explicitly treats
corporations differently where tort liability is concerned. 38 9 Moreover, one
basic tenet of Dworkin's views is that human rights "trump" collective goals

383. See supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text (discussing Products Liability
Restatement); supra note 364 (discussing Owen).
384. See supra notes 21-26, 143-145, 309-316, 332-347 and accompanying text. For
Owen's reasons for not including spreading of costs, see infra note 400.
385. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312
U.S. 492 (1941).
386. No pun intended.
387. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, cmt. f (AM. L. INST.
1997).
388. See, e.g., supra notes 349-352 and accompanying text (discussing Rawls's view of
persons and role of expectations); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 348, at xvii-xviii (criticizing
utilitarianism and stating his intent to replace it with a social contract scheme based on Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant); id. at 160-78 (comparing his scheme with utilitarianism).
389. See infra notes 424-427 and accompanying text (discussing Dworkin's view of
corporate responsibility).
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like maximizing utility.3 90 He has also explicitly stated: "The common law of
torts is better explained by . .. [its] set of interwoven ethical and moral
principles than it is by any assumption that the law aims at some stipulated
version of economic efficiency." 3 9 1 For a number of reasons, a full discussion
of Kant is beyond the scope of this Article. However, Kant's concern that
humans be treated as ends, rather than as means to an end, clearly conflicts
with utilitarian schemes.3 92
On some issues, Owen recognizes that the rights of humans necessitate
limits on the calculus of risk approach and, because of these limits, argues for
strict liability in the context of manufacturing defects and innocent
misrepresentation.3 93 However, his test for design defects is based on
efficiency and on utilitarianism because of his view that this approach does
not violate rights.3 94 As a result, his test for design defects is simply a
utilitarian approach that ignores the basic problems with seeking the efficient
maximation of "good" without addressing the distribution of the costs and
benefits of that maximation.395 Because of the importance of design defect
claims,3 96 a rights-based scheme should have greater concern for victimsfor example, by placing the burden of proof on the defendant,3 97 by using the

390. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi, 232-38 (1978)
(viewing rights as "trumps held by individuals" in the face of collective goals like maximizing
utility).
391. DWORKIN, supra note 361, at 291.
392. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 421, 428 (1987) (noting
that one of the basic premises of the Kantian approach is that "individuals have rights that 'trump'
the demands of utility and efficiency"); Robert Johnson & Adam Cureton, Kant's Moral
Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 8, at 8, 14 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall
2017 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112017/entries/kant-moral/ (summarizing Kant's
views in terms of the following: "One should 'act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become universal law."' A human person "must be
treated always as an end in itself.").
393. See supra note 364. This strict liability approach is contrary to his argument in an
earlier article that fault is a necessary requirement for tort liability and that, therefore, strict
liability for product defects is "misguided." Id.
394. See discussion of Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364.
395. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 340; supra note 384 and accompanying text. For
discussion of lack of concern with distribution in utilitarianism, see, for example, NORMAN E.
BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION
TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29-50 (4th ed. 2008) (critiquing utilitarianism);
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 348, at 65-73 (discussing distribution); id. at 160-78 (comparing

his system to utilitarianism).
396. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 117, at 477 (stating that the "concept of design
defectiveness lies at the heart of products liability law"), 479 (stating that "design defectiveness
is still the dominant claim in most major products liability cases").
397. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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time-of-trial standard for design defects,3 98 and by limiting the role of
comparative fault.399
Owen justifies his choice for utilitarianism as a test for design defect by
the use of rational choices in "a hypothetical consent perspective" like that in
Rawls's conception of the "original position" where persons, who are behind
"a veil of ignorance" of their actual views and condition in life, choose
principles of justice. 400 However, Owen's use of the original position is so
different from Rawls's approach that it is not consistent with Rawls's theory,
which uses the original position in a particular way as a part of a much larger,
more complex alternative to utilitarianism. 40' Two points illustrate how much
Owen diverges from Rawls's scheme.
First, the original position is not designed for addressing specific issues
and doctrines. Instead, the original position provides a framework for
adopting the basic principles of justice. 402 This adoption is the first of four
chronological stages. The other three stages are: (1) adoption of a constitution;
(2) passage of legislation; and (3) application of rules to particular cases. 403
Depending on one's view of common law development, crashworthiness
could be viewed as legislation or as application of rules.
Second, Owen asserts that persons choosing a scheme of justice in the
"original position" "would be risk neutral." 404 He then argues that, given this
neutrality, they would choose to promote "the general benefit of the
community as a whole" by placing on the victims "the risk of harmful
consequences that inevitably flow from reasonable efforts of manufacturers
to protect the public good." 405 However, Rawls argued that, in order "to set
up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just," persons in
the original position should be behind a "veil of ignorance" concerning

398. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 21-26, 337-346, infra notes 432-437 and accompanying text.
400. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at 503-04. He also uses this approach to
reject spreading of losses as a concern for products liability because private and social insurance
schemes would be selected in the original position. Id. at 504.
401. See, e.g., RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 348, at 52-53 (discussing principles of
justice); id at 62 ("efficiency alone cannot serve as a principle of justice"); id. at 65-73
(discussing distribution); id. at 160-78 (comparing his system to utilitarianism); id at 171-76
(discussing four-stage sequence with original position as first stage). For a useful discussion of
the problems of applying Rawls's theory to tort law, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rawls in Tort
Theory: Themes and Counterthemes, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1923 (2004).
402. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 349, at 118-23, 172.
403. Id. at 171-76.
404. Owen, Moral Foundations,supra note 364, at 503.
405. Id. at 503-04.

812

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 741

individual characteristics like gender, race, and intelligence. 406 As a result,
they would not know whether they would be winners or losers in society.
Consequently, argues Rawls, they would not be risk neutral. Instead, they
would be highly risk averse and choose a maximin strategy which would
maximize the minimum that would result if they were losers in the "lottery of
birth" and thus could lack the resources necessary for a meaningful life. 407
The third problem with Owen's approach is his claim that "auto makers
and auto drivers have roughly equivalent responsibilities." 408 This assertion
of equivalence is not supported by any arguments to support the position that
it is moral or just to expand schemes which are designed and used for guiding
human interactions with one another to include nonhuman "corporate
persons" on an equivalent basis. 409 Such supporting arguments are needed
because attempts to adopt such equivalence and expand moral schemes as the
basis for legal rights of animals, including primates with language skills, have
been soundly rejected. 410

The lack of moral equivalence is important because it provides the basis
for providing recovery despite the causal role of extremely risky behavior like
that involved in Donze, which can be appropriately labeled as immoral in
terms of human obligations to one another. 41' However, if concern for
personal safety, possible criminal and regulatory sanctions, and possible tort
liability as a defendant did not deter the conduct, the only possible reason for
denying recovery for defective crashworthiness is a moralistic desire to
scapegoat and punish the injured plaintiff, without regard for the injury costs

406. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 348, at 118-19.
407. Id. at 132-35. Technically, the term comes from the maximum minimorum. Id. at 133
n. 19. For notion of "lottery of birth," see, for example, id. at 89 (referring to "the natural lottery
in native assets," endowments, and advantages).
408. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
409. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 391-92 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(In discussing the basic distinction between humans and corporations, Justice Scalia notes that
"the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and women not, for example, trees or
polar bears."); Bailey H. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the
Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990) (discussing asymmetric advantages of corporate
merchants in dealing with human consumers).
410. See, e.g., State v. LeVasseur, 613 P.2d 1328, 1332-34 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980)
(rejecting attempt to defend charge of theft of dolphins on ground of lesser of two evils where
dolphins had been "liberated" from research facility where they were allegedly depressed by
being captive subjects for experiments); RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 349, at 19 (Persons
participating in a system of social cooperation must have a "capacity for a sense of justice and a
capacity for a conception of the good."); F. Patrick Hubbard, Do Androids Dream: Personhood
and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 405, 413-18 (2011) (discussing denial of
personhood to animals and limited nature of human obligations to animals).
411. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for discussion of facts in Donze.
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incurred by the victim, even though this treatment produces virtually no
tangible benefits in terms of reduction of accident costs.
Given this lack of deterrence, Owen's approach actually reduces the
efficient reduction of accident costs. Because manufacturers focus on liability
costs rather than accident costs in comparing safety costs and accident
costs,412 an inefficiently low expenditure on safety is likely when comparative

fault reduces plaintiffs' recoveries. As a result, Owen's approach does not
satisfy his utilitarian concern with efficiently maximizing utility.
Similar rejections of "equivalent responsibilities" where corporations are
concerned can be illustrated by considering privacy, a widely recognized basic
human value in our society. This broad value encompasses both physical
space and nonphysical private data and enables humans to engage in selfreflection, to focus on creativity and learning, to relax and "be yourself' and
experience a sense of 61an and joie de vivre, to share private, intimate
relationships, and to pursue shared goals. 4 13 An attempt by a corporation to
claim this uniquely human personal right was recently rejected by the
Supreme Court in FederalCommunications Commission v. A T&TInc., which
partly relied on common meanings in finding that the statutory phrase
"personal privacy" did not include corporate persons. 414 The Court also relied
on comment c to Section 6521 of the Second Torts Restatement which states:
"A corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association has no personal
right of privacy. "415
In Kantian terms, personal concerns and values like fairness and privacy
are designed for relationships among human persons as ends in themselves. 416
Nonhuman corporations are not ends in themselves. Instead, they are, by
design, simply a means for humans to seek human goals. In the case of a forprofit corporation, the goal is maximizing profits, and the officers and

412. See supra notes 21-26, 337-346 and accompanying text; infra notes 432-437 and
accompanying text.
413. E.g., Patrick Hubbard, The Needfor Privacy Torts in an Era of UbiquitousDisclosure
and Surveillance, in CORE CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PRIVACY 137, 139-40

(Ann E. Cudd & Mark C. Navin eds., 2018).
414. 562 U.S. 397, 403-04 (2011). An association may assert the privacy rights of its
human members where necessary to protect their right to freedom of association. Nat'l Ass'n
for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
415. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. at 406. The Court also relied on similar language from
the second edition of Prosser's Law of Torts. Id. at 406-07.
416. See discussion of Kant, supra note 392.
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directors of the company are required to pursue only this goal. 4 17 This
characterization of for-profit corporations is virtually undisputed. For
example, Owen agrees that, because for-profit corporations focus on
maximizing profits, they need to be incentivized by products liability to seek
efficient accident cost reduction. 418

One way to increase profits is to externalize costs to persons outside the
corporation-for example, by simply dumping harmful pollutants into the air
or water rather than incurring more expensive measures. If fines for pollution
or liability payments for injuries caused by defective products are less than
the costs that are externalized, a for-profit corporation will choose to
externalize the costs. 4 19 Similarly, automobile manufacturers can externalize

costs by reducing or avoiding liability for injuries caused by defective
automobiles. 420 Imposing liability for defective crashworthiness, regardless of
the fault of victims or third parties in causing the initial collision, prevents

417. E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); BAKAN, supra note
296, at 28-59; Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability?Not on My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH.
U. L. REv. 651 (2012). Dodge v. FordMotor Co. notes:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. The difference in behavior between for-profit and non-profit
corporations can be extraordinarily striking. For example, a report on a study of U.S. Department
of Education data concerning student loan forgiveness requests alleging fraud revealed:
Of the more than 98,800 complaints received by the department as of mid-August,
98.6 percent came from students at for-profit schools, while only 1.4 percent of them
were filed by those who attended non-profit institutions. For-profit schools account
for only 10 percent of national enrollment and 18 percent of federal student debt,
according to government data.
Maria Danilova, Study: Most Student Loan Fraud Claims Involve For-Profits, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/2f357cc6162b49febd56de912eff750d. One of
the authors of the report noted that for-profits "are motivated to maximize their profits . . . ." Id.
418. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at 477 ("Maximizing profits is the
manufacturer's classic measure of success in satisfying the welfare of its shareholders."); id. at
479-81 (Because of "the inherent primacy of the manufacturer's allegiance to its shareholders,"
products liability law is necessary to impose liability in order to promote cost-effective safety
design "by 'deterring' manufacturers from selling products that contain excessive dangers.").
419. BAKAN, supra note 296, at 60-84.
420. See, e.g., Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 972-73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that testimony concerning General Motors' policy of "minimal spending" on safety
was admissible in claim for punitive damages).
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such externalization and harnesses the profit motive as a way to reduce
accident costs efficiently.
A human concerned solely with personal profit in this manner would be
viewed as a psychopath. 421 Given the nature of for-profit corporations, it is
wrong to use moral notions of fairness to argue for treating these corporations
"fairly" vis-A-vis humans. 422

Because human shareholders are entitled to be treated as ends, it is often
argued that this should entitle the corporation to be a proxy for its innocent
human shareholders. 423 Such an argument ignores the fact that the payment of
a tort award by a large corporation impacts shareholders in a limited, indirect
manner. They will, for example, usually suffer only a modest reduction, if
any, in dividends. At worst, only their equity could be lost. There will be no
moral censure of shareholders for a large publicly held corporation's tortious
actions. Moreover, to the extent that we are concerned with fairness, it must
be remembered that the shareholder receives a number of benefits from the
use of the corporate form of business. By investing in a large corporation, the
shareholder has elected to take advantage of limited liability and of the
increased efficiency of the complex structure of a modem large-scale
corporate organization. The shareholder may also benefit financially from
corporate torts that are not discovered.
Ronald Dworkin, who adopted a view of human persons like that of John
Rawls,

424

argued that where corporations and morality are concerned, we

421. BAKAN, supra note 296, at 2 ("pathological institution"); id. at 56 ("[c]orporate
operatives can be characterized as psychopathic . . [even though] they can function normally
outside the corporation . . . ."); id. at 56-57 (corporations have "psychopathic traits"); see, e.g.,
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-68 (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing
corporate power and referring to corporation as "Frankenstein monster").
422. E.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations:A Normative Modelfor
Imposing Strict Liabilityfor Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465, 470-71 (1978).
423. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 909

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (discussing

punitive damages awards against corporations); Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 364, at
468-69 ("Manufacturers must act paternalistically to protect with equal concern and respectthe freedom and other interests of competing constituencies: shareholders are entitled to a fair
return on their investments; potential accident victims are entitled to a fair measure of product
safety; and users are entitled to a fair measure of usefulness in their products, a proper but not
excessive level of product safety, and the availability of products at a fair price.").
Owen also argues that the moral rights of "other consumers" are violated by a negligent
"victim's greed in demanding greater usefulness from the product than other consumers sought
and greater usefulness than was reflected in the price he paid." Id. at 476. However, where
crashworthiness is involved, the victim who negligently caused the initial collision is only
"demanding" the same level of cost-effective crashworthiness as other users.
424. Hubbard, supra note 410, at 412-13. For discussion of Rawls, see supra notes 349352, 388, 401 and accompanying text.
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should "frame our question in the first instance as a question about corporate
responsibility." 42 5 From this perspective, "anyone who has had full control
over the manufacture of a defective product has a responsibility to compensate
those injured by it. No individual employee or shareholder has had that
control, but the corporation has." 42 6 If we are to take "the corporation
seriously as a moral agent" with an accepted role as an institution, then the
corporation controlling the manufacturing of the defective product has a moral
responsibility to compensate victims.

427

The issue, therefore, is: what is the

best way to impose this responsibility on corporations?
This Article argues that the best way to impose this responsibility is to
treat for-profit corporations as complex "machines" that can be used to
enhance human life in many ways. 428 In terms of cost-effective reduction of
accident costs, this treatment of for-profit corporations supports recovery for
defective crashworthiness regardless of the plaintiffs fault in causing the
original collision. This approach would also apply in other areas of products
liability law.429
C. Implementation
Moral notions like efficiency and fairness among humans are complex
mixtures of philosophy and social attitudes. 43 0 As a result, agreement on a
normative approach to accident law is, at best, difficult to find. The issue in
Donze illustrates this difficulty because there are two competing positionsefficiency and fairness-concerning the proper approach. However, as
indicated above, 43 1corporations are not entitled to fairness in the way humans
are. Consequently, the primary concerns in terms of products liability should
be on efficient accident reduction and fairness to humans.

425. DWORKIN, supra note 362, at 170.

426.
427.
428.
429.
approach
liability).
430.
431.

Id.
Id. at 171.
See, e.g., supra notes 359-360 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 134-145 and accompanying text (discussing California
to design defect); 315-316 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several
CALABRESI, supra note 326, at 291-92, 294.

See supra notes 354-427 and accompanying text.
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Efficiency

One position is reflected in the adoption of Section 402A of the Second
Torts Restatement. One reason for this adoption was a desire to achieve two
policy concerns: (1) the adoption of safety measures which are cost-effective,
and (2) the reduction of the lump sum costs imposed on victims injured by
products. 43 2 The expansion of the liability for inefficient safety design of
sellers was based on the view that sellers, particularly manufacturers, would
be incentivized by that liability to provide safer products in order to avoid the
increased liability costs that would result where unreasonably dangerous
defects are involved. 433 This view is based on the ability of corporate
manufacturers to use their institutional structures to coordinate "rational
conduct" to select designs to address safety costs efficiently. 43 4 Though it
might be theoretically cheaper to achieve accident reduction by safer driving
by humans, it is unrealistic to expect such change in conduct. 435 For this
reason, crashworthiness liability should be based on foreseeability of crashes
regardless of cause. 436 In order for this scheme to incentivize the manufacturer
adequately, the costs of inefficient safety decisions must be internalized to the
manufacturer rather than externalized to victims or third parties. 43 7
2.

Fairness

The alternative position is that liability should be allocated fairly.
However, fairness is extraordinarily vague and there is often disagreement
about what is fair, particularly where for-profit corporations are involved. For
example, jurisdictions disagree concerning whether it is fair to assess
defective design based on knowledge at the time of trial. 438
Nevertheless, there are occasional points of agreement. For example, it is
generally agreed that some forms of comparative fault are more fair than the
old common law system. 43 9 However, there is considerable disagreement

432. See supra notes 155, 327-346 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 331-346 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 338 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 327-346 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 21-26, 332-346 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
439. Compare supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussing objections to
common law system for treating plaintiffs' fault), with supra notes 248-251 and accompanying
text (discussing types of comparative fault for plaintiffs and problems with simply abolishing
joint and several liability).
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concerning the best approach for achieving fairness in allocating liability. For
example, should a pure or modified system be used for comparing plaintiffs'
fault with defendants' fault? 440 This type of issue also arises in allocating
responsibility among defendants. 44 1

Initially, as comparative fault evolved, some argued that it is not possible
to compare strict liability with fault, which is "based on blameworthiness in a
moral sense." 442 This argument noted "that 'apples and oranges' cannot be
compared, and that 'oil and water' do not mix ... . "443 This argument was
rejected on the ground that such "insistence on fixed and precise definitional
treatment of legal concepts" 444 and "fixed semantic consistency" 445 was not
appropriate. Instead, the better approach was to use a "judicial posture that is
flexible rather than doctrinaire" 446 and to seek "the attainment of a just and
equitable result." 447 Given this approach, "the term 'equitable apportionment
448
or allocation of loss' may be more descriptive than 'comparative fault."'
Two somewhat contradictory points of agreement support this shift to
equitable allocation of loss. First, there is a widely shared acceptance of the
use of juries to apportion responsibility fairly in terms of precise percentages
of responsibility based on the consideration of extraordinarily vague factors
like nature of the person's risk-creating conduct and strength of causal
connection between that conduct and the harm. 449 Second, it is also widely
agreed that this task of precisely measuring incommensurable actions and
causal roles is virtually impossible, particularly for lay juries. 45 0 Though the

440. See supra notes 248-251 and accompanying text (discussing comparative fault
schemes for allocating losses between plaintiffs and defendants).
441. See supra notes 307-314 and accompanying text (discussing comparative fault
schemes for allocating losses among defendants).
442. Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Cal. 1978).
443. Id. at 1167.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 1168.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. See supra notes 11-12, 14, 255 and accompanying text.
450. See, e.g., Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 628-35, 638-44
(Or. 1982) (addressing difficulty of jury assessment of comparative fault); DOBBS, supra note
148, § 202 (discussing factors relevant to responsibility and potential problems in application);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 384-86 (discussing jury guidelines and noting that comparative
fault systems "have had to allow for the fact that comparisons of fault cannot be made
scientifically"); Ray J. Aiken, ProportioningComparativeNegligence: Problems of Theory and
Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 293, 295 (1970); David W. Robertson,
Eschewing Ersatz Percentages:A Simplified Vocabulary of Comparative Fault, 45 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 831 (2001) (discussing difficulty of communicating factors to jury); David C. Sobelsohn,
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arbitrary nature of using juries to do the impossible has been noted, it appears
it has been accepted because of a view that: (1) it is less unfair than the
traditional common law system; and (2) given the lack of precise objective
standards, there is no alternative.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that "[r]ough approximation is no
substitute for justice." 45 ' In addition, no matter how fair or just an
apportionment may be, any reduction in the liability of for-profit corporate
manufacturers will reduce their incentive to spend money on efficient cost
reduction. 45 2

An "apples to oranges" problem, like that addressed in the decision to
include strict liability in comparative allocations of loss, arises in comparing
human fault with corporate conduct by for-profit corporations. Jurors
arguably have sufficient experience with human behavior to evaluate in some
rough sense degrees of moral wrongdoing-for example, by referring to an
attitude toward risk (a "state of mind") to determine if a human was
negligent. 453 Determining state of mind of a mindless entity like a corporation
is a different matter. Despite this difference, there has been virtually no
concern 454 with the problem of using individualistic morality-based measures
of human conduct to evaluate the conduct of nonhuman institutional
corporations motivated solely by profit maximation 455 which, partly because
of this motivation, are much better than humans at evaluating risk. 456
V.

ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED IN DONZE

A.

Branham v. Ford Motor Co. and the ProductsLiability Restatement

As indicated above, Branham v. Ford Motor Co. rejected the consumer
expectation test and adopted the cost-benefit approach of the Products

Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413 (1984) (noting problems of giving guidance for comparing
a variety of types of "wrongful" causal conduct to diverse parties).
451. Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. 1987) (finding
trial court erred in presenting to jury the issue of apportionment of causation between asbestos
exposure and cigarette smoking).
452. See supra notes 21-26, 337-339, 431-438 and accompanying text.
453. DOBBS, supra note 148, at 508 (discussing negligence as a state of mind in the
comparison of fault).
454. For an example of an article showing such concern, see Mary J. Davis, Individual and
InstitutionalResponsibility: A Vision for ComparativeFault in ProductsLiability, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 281 (1994).
455. See supra notes 417-420 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 335-338 and accompanying text.
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Liability Restatement as the sole test of design defect. 45 7 In contrast, Donze

does not mention the Products Liability Restatement even though Section 17
explicitly addresses crashworthiness. 458 Given the number of differences
between Section 402A of the Second Torts Restatement and the Products
Liability Restatement, the apparently ad hoc approach in the court's use of the
Products Liability Restatement results in considerable uncertainty as to the
direction of products liability in South Carolina.
Crashworthiness cases always present the issue of determining which
injuries are caused by the initial collision and which are caused by the second
collision. In Donze, it was fairly easy to apportion damages between the
injuries caused by the physical impact in the first collision and the bums
caused by the fire after the first collision. In other situations, it may be harder
to apportion damages. Subsection 16(c) of the ProductsLiability Restatement
addresses apportionments in harder cases. 45 9 Will this subsection play a role
in apportioning damages in South Carolina?
The South Carolina products liability statute totally bars recovery where
the plaintiff assumes the risk by unreasonably using the product after
discovering the defect and becoming aware of the danger. 460 Assumption of
risk has been merged with comparative fault in South Carolina. Will the total
statutory bar continue to apply?
Negligence and statutory claims for design defect appear to have been
merged by the decision in Branham v. Ford Motor Co. to adopt Section 2(b)

457. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.
459. Section 16 provides:
Increased Harm Due to Product Defect
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or other
distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiffs harm
beyond that which would have resulted from other causes, the product seller is subject
to liability for the increased harm.
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from
other causes in the absence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is
limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect.
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm
that would have resulted in the absence of the product defect, the product seller is
liable for all of the plaintiff s harm attributable to the defect and other causes.
(d) A seller of a defective product that is held liable for part of the harm suffered
by the plaintiff under Subsection (b), or all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff under
Subsection (c), is jointly and severally liable or severally liable with other parties who
bear legal responsibility for causing the harm, determined by applicable rules of joint
and several liability.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
460. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (2005) (quoted supra at text accompanying note 195).
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of the Products Liability Restatement.46' Donze also reflects this view in
stating that negligence, strict liability, and warranty are all the same for
purposes of crashworthiness. 462 Given this merger, how will ordinary
negligence be treated in terms of a defense? Will this merger affect whether
comparative negligence applies to the statutory limitation of defenses to a
person's unreasonable use with knowledge and awareness of the defect and
risk? 463
Issues of product misuse have been raised in several South Carolina
cases. 464 It is not clear whether misuse in these cases related to the existence
of a defect, cause-in-fact, legal cause, or all of the above. Regardless of
relevance, the alleged misuse was rejected in each case largely because the
use involved was foreseeable.
The Products Liability Restatement treats misuse (along with product
alteration and modification) as relevant to "the issue of defect, causation, and
comparative responsibility." 465 Foreseeability of misuse is relevant to whether
an alternative design should have been adopted. 466 The Products Liability
Restatement also provides that the treatment of any misuse, modification, or
alteration "is to be resolved under the prevailing rules and principles
governing [defect and] causation or the prevailing rules and principles
governing comparative responsibility, as the case may be." 467 Determining
what "the case may be" in South Carolina involves far too many variables to
be addressed in this Article.
B.

Seatbelt Use

Section 56-5-6520 of the South Carolina Code imposes a statutory duty
to use safety belts and child restraint systems. Section 56-5-6460 provides: "A

461. 390 S.C. 203, 221-25, 701 S.E.2d 5, 15-17 (2010). See supra notes 196-198 and
accompanying text for discussion of Branham.
462. Donze v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 420 S.C. 8, 20, 800 S.E.2d 479, 486 (2017).
463. See supra note 195 for discussion of limitation in South Carolina products liability
statute. The language in this statutory limit is similar to Section 402A of the Second Restatement.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
464. E.g., Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252
S.C. 202, 240, 166 S.E.2d 173, 190 (1969); Small v. Pioneer Machinery, 329 S.C. 448, 494
S.E.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1997).
465. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 17 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
Similar language is also contained id. § 2 cmt. p and id. § 15 cmt. b. For further discussion of
misuse, see OWEN, supra note 117, § 13.5.
466. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. p (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
467. Id. § 15 cmt. b; see id. § 2 cmt. p; id. § 17 cmt. c.
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violation of this article does not constitute negligence per se or contributory
negligence and is not admissible as evidence in a civil action." 468 In Sims v.
Gregory, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the language in
section 56-5-6460 "clearly states a violation of the mandatory seatbelt law
cannot be used as evidence in a civil action to show that a driver or occupant
of a motor vehicle failed to use a safety belt." 469
In Jimenez v. DaimlerChryslerCorp., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a decision by the district court which had upheld the exclusion of
seatbelt use evidence. 470 Though this involved the common law bar of seatbelt
use that was in effect before the adoption of the seatbelt statute, Jimenez was
used in the Donze decision and contains a useful review of the two arguments
for admitting evidence of nonuse in a crashworthiness case.
The first argument is that misusing or failing to use the restraint system
could have been a cause-in-fact of all or part of the increased injury.
Therefore, evidence of that failure is relevant to the amount of damages
caused by the crashworthiness defect. 47' A similar cause-in-fact argument
may have been raised in the concurring opinion in Donze.472 Will Sims v.

Gregory bar admission of the evidence of nonuse for this purpose?
The second argument is that the restraint system is relevant to the issue of
defectiveness of the crashworthy system as a whole because proper use of the
system reduces the need for more costly alternative protections. 473 Arguably,
this use would not be barred by section 56-5-6460 because nonuse of the
system is not directly involved. However, this argument encounters problems
with the foreseeability of injuries which provides the basis of the
crashworthiness doctrine. 474 The argument also presents the problem that
juries may make inferences concerning the possible role of nonuse in the
extent of the injuries to the plaintiff.

468. A similar provision in section 56-5-6460 also bars the admission of a failure to satisfy
South Carolina Code section 56-5-6410, which requires child restraint systems for children less
than six years old. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6410, -6460 (2018).
469. Sims v. Gregory, 387 S.C. 169, 173, 691 S.E.2d 480, 481 (Ct. App. 2010). Sims was
interpreting section 56-5-6540(c) of the code applicable at the time. The language of this section
is the same as that in S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6460 (2018).
470. 269 F.3d 439, 457-59 (4th Cir. 2001). Other courts have also addressed the concerns
raised in Jimenez. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
471. Jimenez, 269 F.3d at 459.
472. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
473. Jimenez, 269 F.3d at 458-59; accord, e.g., Clark v. Mazda Motor Corp., 68 P.3d 207,
209 (Okla. 2003).
474. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In large part, the disagreements among the states concerning enhanced
injuries reflects a divergence in opinion about the relative importance of
efficient accident reduction vis-A1-vis fairness in addressing injuries caused by
defective products. Some states still emphasize efficiency and the
responsibility of corporations to address the policy goals of accident reduction
and cost spreading underlying Section 402A. In order to further these goals,
these states define the manufacturer's duty in a way that precludes considering
the fault of the plaintiff or third parties in determining the manufacturer's
liability. Other states place greater weight on fairness to corporations by
defining defect by, for example, allowing "state of the art" to be the measure
of defect 475 and in using juries to apportion liability equitably on the basis of
vague standards like nature of wrongdoing and strength of causal relationship.
Thus, the split among jurisdictions reflects a disagreement about whether
to pursue the efficient reduction of accident costs by incentivizing efficient
safety decisions by manufacturers or to seek a fair result by an unstructured
proportional allocation of responsibility by juries. Underlying this
disagreement is a difference in view concerning for-profit corporations: are
they amoral machines whose profit motive must be harnessed by imposing a
social role for enhancing safety through the imposition of tort duties, or are
they moral entities, like humans, with a moral and legal right to a fair
allocation of responsibility?
Because manufacturers make design decisions on the basis of their
liability costs, not on the basis of the total accident costs resulting from their
decisions, 476 states concerned with efficient accident cost reduction focus on
the social role of corporations and, therefore, impose a duty that will
internalize inefficient accident costs to manufacturers. 477 This imposition is
necessary because, to the extent that these costs can be externalized, the
manufacturer's liability costs are lowered. In turn, the safety cost breakeven
point in terms of profitability will be lowered to the level of the liability costs.
Therefore, neither the plaintiffs nor a third party's fault should be used to
reduce the manufacturer's liability. This Article takes the position that this
approach is the correct treatment of the crashworthiness issue in Donze. In

475. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 21-26, 307-314, 333-346, 417-420 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 326-353 and accompanying text.
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addition,

efficient

accident

cost reduction

supports

human-centered

approaches in other areas of products liability.478

The states that apply comparative fault to the initial cause of the accident
rely on fairness, even though: (1) this application reduces manufacturers'
incentives to choose efficient levels of crashworthiness, 479 and (2) it is clear
that juries have virtually unlimited discretion to decide what is fair. 480 The
argument for this reliance starts with the point that the fault of the other parties
is also a cause-in-fact of the injuries. Though this point is valid, it does not,
by itself, justify lessening the incentives for safety on manufacturers. The
crashworthiness doctrine is built on the realistic view that human wrongdoing
is foreseeable in large part because humans are not very good at rationally
assessing risk or at acting on rational assessments. As a result, using
comparative fault to impose accident costs on humans is a relatively
ineffective way to reduce accident costs. Instead, because corporations are
better at assessing risks, imposing liability for inefficient safety decisions on
sellers is a better way to reduce accidents efficiently.
The fairness argument for this reduction in efficient accident prevention
is flawed in two ways. First, it ignores the basic difference between humans
and corporations: for-profit corporations exhibit an immoral pathology of
focusing only on profits. It is unfair to treat such entities on an equal moral
basis with humans. Second, the comparative allocation of liability has the
problem that the jury allocation is virtually unstructured. In contrast, the use
of duty in tort to impose liability, regardless of the fault of the victim or third
parties, not only reduces injuries, it also provides a clear answer that is
defended on the basis of well-established policy goals of tort law.
A similar approach to duty has been widely used in addressing enhanced
injury resulting from medical malpractice. Where the malpractice occurs in
addressing an injury from an automobile collision, the majority view is that
any fault of the patient is irrelevant to the determination of the liability of the
medical provider. 481 The reasons for this approach include the following:
Such ... [an approach] is in accord with sound principles of social
policy. "The improper or inappropriate imposition of the defense of

478. See, e.g., supra notes 138-145 (discussing California approach to design defect);
161-167 (discussing strict liability approaches in Products Liability Restatement); 315-316
(discussing joint and several liability) and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 21-26, 307-314, 333-346, 417-420 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 307-314, 417-420 and accompanying text.
481. E.g., Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 128-30 (Tenn. 2004); Rowe v.
Sisters of Pallottine Missionary Soc'y, 560 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 2001).
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[comparative] negligence can lead to the dilution or diminution of a
duty of care." . .. It would be anomalous to posit, on the one hand,
that a health care provider is required to meet a uniform standard of
care in its delivery of medical services to all patients, but permit, on
the other hand, the conclusion that, where a breach of that duty is
established, no liability may exist if the patients' own preinjury
conduct caused the illness or injury which necessitated the medical
care. 482

The approach of products liability and medical malpractice is similar in
another important way. In contrast to the negligence causing the need for
medical care, comparative fault applies to wrongful failure by the victim
patient to, for example, follow a physician's instructions concerning treatment
of the injury that resulted in the need for treatment. 483 This approach parallels
the approach to seatbelt nonuse in crashworthiness cases. 48 4 In both medical
malpractice and products liability, the need to promote important policy
concerns supports the imposition, based on the defendant's relationship with
the victim, of a duty to prevent enhanced injury to victims. This responsibility
is implemented in terms of duty, which is perhaps the most basic and distinctly
legal aspect of the structure of a tort. 485 Where a defendant breaches a duty in
tort to protect a plaintiff from a specific category of risk, the general rule is:
[T]he defendant cannot defend on the ground of contributory
negligence, since that was the very thing he was obliged to prevent.
Another way to state essentially the same idea is to say that what
counts as contributory negligence is determined largely by the scope
of the defendant's duty. 486
The approach used in imposing role responsibility in Donze and in medical
malpractice is consistent with this general rule, is solidly grounded in policy,
and should be the rule for all crashworthiness cases.

482. Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. Mid-Coast Hosp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37-38 (D. Me. 1999)
(quoting Bryant v. Calantone, 669 A.2d 286, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996)).
483. E.g., DOBBS, supranote 148, at 631.
484. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
485. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 148, at 577 (noting that "duty is the foundation of all
liability for negligence"); David G. Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001)
("[D]uty is properly conceived as the primary element of a negligence claim .... ).
486. DOBBS, supra note 148, at 500. The statement quoted above is supported by various
examples. Id. at 500-03.
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